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EXORCISING THE CLERGY PRIVILEGE 
Christine P. Bartholomew* 
This Article debunks the empirical assumption behind the clergy 
privilege, the evidentiary rule shielding confidential communications 
with clergy. For over a century, scholars and the judiciary have 
assumed generous protection is essential to foster and encourage 
spiritual relationships. Accepting this premise, all fifty states and the 
District of Columbia have adopted virtually absolute privilege 
statutes. To test this assumption, this Article distills data from over 
700 decisions—making it the first scholarship to analyze state clergy 
privilege jurisprudence exhaustively. This review finds a privilege in 
decline; courts have lost faith in the privilege. More surprisingly, 
though, so have clergy. For decades, clergy have recast 
communications to ensure they fall outside testimonial protection—
thus challenging how essential confidentiality actually is to spiritual 
relationships. This Article discusses both why clergy testimony 
frequently decides the question of privilege and the corresponding 
query of why some clergy break confidences. This understanding 
breathes new life into efforts to revise state statutes to reflect the 
narrowing privilege rather than perpetuate illusory promises of broad 
protection. 
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INTRODUCTION 
HE prevailing, two-century-old narrative depicts the clergy privilege 
as a battle between state power to compel testimony and secular 
commitment to protect spiritual communications.1 If a communication 
satisfies the privilege, a court cannot force the speaker or cleric to reveal 
the confidence.2 The premise of this narrative is an empirically untested 
assumption: only a broad absolute privilege can promote spiritual 
relationships, encourage individual autonomy, and mediate legal and 
canonical obligations.3 A case-specific or qualified privilege will not 
achieve these ends. 
 
1 See, e.g., Shawn P. Bailey, How Secrets Are Kept: Viewing the Current Clergy-Penitent 
Privilege Through a Comparison with the Attorney-Client Privilege, 2002 BYU L. Rev. 489, 
489–90 (“Th[e] conflict between the state’s coercive power to collect evidence and the right 
to maintain confidential certain religious communications lies at the center of every 
challenge to the clergy-penitent privilege.”). 
2 See, e.g., Mullen v. United States, 263 F.2d 275, 280 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (“[A] clergyman 
shall not disclose on a trial the secrets of a penitent’s confidential confession . . . at least 
absent the penitent’s consent.”); accord Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 107 (1876) 
(“[S]uits cannot be maintained which would require a disclosure of the confidences of the 
confessional . . . .”). 
3 See, e.g., Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980) (“The priest-penitent 
privilege recognizes the human need to disclose to a spiritual counselor, in total and absolute 
confidence, what are believed to be flawed acts or thoughts and to receive priestly 
consolation and guidance in return.”). For clarity and consistency, this Article uses the 
T 
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Judicial decisions continue to perpetuate the untested “empirical 
assumption”4 that a broad privilege is essential for clergy-communicant 
relationships to thrive.5 This assumption comes at a high cost. It 
supports an absolute privilege, which in turn sacrifices the highly 
probative, even outcome-determinative evidence contained in such 
communications. Nonetheless, this prevailing narrative presupposes 
clergy would place the sanctity of confidential communications with 
their flocks above judicial truth finding. 
What if a different, more nuanced story exists? One where clergy 
want to testify about certain communications? And by acting on that 
desire, clergy—those presumed most likely to protect it—are actually 
narrowing the privilege? 
Using data culled from over 700 federal and state clergy privilege 
decisions, this Article challenges the “empirical assumption” behind the 
absolute privilege. In doing so, it tells this second story. The data 
describes a privilege in decline: two-thirds of the time, courts rule 
against a privilege assertion.6 More interesting, though, is the clergy’s 
reluctance to embrace an absolute privilege. Rather than asserting 
bright-line protection, for many, the decision to testify is case specific. 
 
phrase “the clergy privilege” and calls the parties to the privilege “clergy” and 
“communicants.” However, even in a single jurisdiction, the privilege goes by many names. 
See, e.g., Lightman v. Flaum, 761 N.E.2d 1027, 1030 n.* (N.Y. 2001) (noting that the 
privilege has been alternatively referred to as the “priest-penitent” privilege, “clergy-
penitent” privilege, “minister-penitent” privilege, “cleric-congregant” privilege, and “clergy-
communicant” privilege (citations omitted)). 
4 Edward J. Imwinkelried, The New Wigmore: A Treatise on Evidence: Evidentiary 
Privileges § 1.2.1 (Richard D. Friedman ed., 1st ed. 2002) [hereinafter Imwinkelried, New 
Wigmore]; see also Edward J. Imwinkelried, The New Wigmore: An Essay on Rethinking 
the Foundation of Evidentiary Privileges, 83 B.U. L. Rev. 315, 321–22 (2003) (discussing 
the assumptions underlying the traditional justification for privileges); cf. Walter J. Walsh, 
The Priest-Penitent Privilege: An Hibernocentric Essay in Postcolonial Jurisprudence, 80 
Ind. L.J. 1037, 1084 (2005) (discussing how “legal and political decisions are informed by a 
social vision that incorporates particular empirical assumptions about human behavior and 
values”). 
5 See Ryan v. Ryan, 642 N.E.2d 1028, 1034 (Mass. 1994) (holding that the privilege, 
unlike most other evidentiary privileges, is “absolute”); R. Michael Cassidy, Sharing Sacred 
Secrets: Is It (Past) Time for a Dangerous Person Exception to the Clergy-Penitent 
Privilege?, 44 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1627, 1673 (2003) (discussing how, because of this 
assumption, “[t]he clergy-penitent privilege has been applied to a larger class of 
communications and a broader class of clergy, and, when it is deemed to apply, it is 
considered impenetrable”). 
6 See infra Section II.A.  
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Consciously or otherwise, and most notably in violent crime cases, 
clergy share confidences that are facially protected under broad state 
statutory language.7 Thus, the clergy’s interpretation of the privilege is 
contributing to its decline. 
This narrowing has significant implications given the role of religion 
in the United States. Eighty-nine percent of Americans self-identify as 
believing in God, a “remarkably high” figure compared to other 
advanced countries.8 For religious Americans, faith impacts everyday 
life. Religious institutions offer frequent opportunities to interact with 
clergy, in which the religious partake.9 From church, to jail, to schools, 
to hospitals, people turn to clergy for guidance.10 Given religion’s 
ubiquitous nature, perhaps it is unsurprising that forty-five percent of 
Americans rely on prayer, personal reflection, or advice from religious 
leaders to make major life decisions.11 Communicants bring “everything 
from theological quandaries to everyday life challenges” to clergy.12 
This context makes the lack of empirical scholarship on clergy 
privilege decisions surprising. While existing scholarship effectively 
 
7 See infra Section III.B (substantiating how clergy share confidences that are facially 
protected). 
8 Pew Research Ctr., U.S. Public Becoming Less Religious (Nov. 3, 2015); see also Mark 
Chaves, American Religion: Contemporary Trends 10 (2011) (“It bears repeating that, by 
world standards, Americans remain remarkably religious in both belief and practice.”). The 
United States houses between 300,000 and 400,000 congregations devoted to hundreds of 
different religious denominations. Nancy T. Ammerman, Introduction: Observing Religious 
Modern Lives, in Everyday Religion: Observing Modern Religious Lives 3, 7 (Nancy T. 
Ammerman ed., 2007); see also Clifford Grammich et al., Ass’n of Statisticians of Am. 
Religious Bodies, 2010 U.S. Religion Census: Religious Congregations & Membership 
Study xv (2012) (identifying 320,000 separate congregations).  
9 See generally, e.g., Gary H. Woolverton, Church Ministry by Design: Designing 
Effective Ministry for Tomorrow’s Church (2011) (discussing the import of religious 
institutions’ influence in activities ranging from gardening to daycare to fine arts). 
10 See, e.g., Tankersley v. State, 724 So. 2d 557, 560 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998) (church); 
People v. Police, 651 P.2d 430, 430 (Colo. App. 1982) (jail); Woodard v. Jupiter Christian 
Sch., 913 So. 2d 1188, 1189–90 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (school); Nicholson v. Wittig, 832 
S.W.2d 681, 682 (Tex. App. 1992) (hospital); cf. Seymour Moskowitz & Michael J. DeBoer, 
When Silence Resounds: Clergy and the Requirement to Report Elder Abuse and Neglect, 49 
DePaul L. Rev. 1, 21 (1999) (“Clergy fill a multitude of personal and professional roles. To 
the religious community, they are administrators and advisers, preachers and public figures, 
counselors and teachers. To the local community, they are fellow citizens and consumers, 
friends and neighbors, parents and spouses.”). 
11 Michael Lipka, 5 Facts About Prayer, Pew Research Ctr. (May 4, 2016). 
12 Nancy Tatom Ammerman, Sacred Stories, Spiritual Tribes: Finding Religion in 
Everyday Life 105 (2014). 
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explores facets of the privilege, no article to date exhaustively analyzes 
this jurisprudence.13 As then–Chief Justice Rehnquist noted, “In an area 
where empirical information would be useful, it is scant and 
inconclusive.”14 However, any challenge to the “empirical assumption” 
must examine the privilege in application—meaning actual judicial 
decisions and clergy testimony in those cases. This Article provides such 
analysis and, in doing so, debunks this time-honored foundational 
presumption. 
Part I begins with the origin and subsequent evolution of clergy 
privilege statutes across the United States. This history is undebated, so 
this Part focuses specifically on the background rules and policy 
considerations necessary for the remainder of the argument. Part II 
details the results of the jurisprudence review. The heart of the empirical 
work underlying the Article, this Part highlights how pivotal clergy 
testimony is to privilege determinations. Rather than pushing for 
expansive testimonial protection, clergy adopt a more selective, 
restrictive conceptualization of the privilege. Part III explores why 
courts rely heavily on clergy testimony in deciding privilege assertions 
and why some clergy share confidences. Part IV then advocates for a 
qualified privilege to bridge the gap between existing, illusory statutory 
protection and the realities of the privilege in application. By exorcising 
the absolutist assumption, the privilege can serve its public policy goals 
 
13 See, e.g., Taylor L. Anderson, The Priest-Penitent Privilege: A Mormon Perspective, 41 
Idaho L. Rev. 55, 57 (2004) (focusing on the privilege’s application to the Mormon faith); 
Cassidy, supra note 5, at 1631 (arguing for the expansion of the dangerous person exception 
to the privilege); Michael J. Mazza, Should Clergy Hold the Priest-Penitent Privilege?, 82 
Marq. L. Rev. 171, 172–73 (1998) (discussing ownership of the privilege); Walsh, supra 
note 4, at 1037–38 (discussing the privilege’s application to Irish Catholics); Ari J. Diaconis, 
Note, The Religion of Alcoholics Anonymous (AA): Applying the Clergy Privilege to 
Certain AA Communications, 99 Cornell L. Rev. 1185, 1188 (2014) (addressing the 
privilege in the context of AA communications). Some discuss the privilege’s history or 
constitutional dimensions. See, e.g., Cassidy, supra note 5, at 1700–22 (discussing First 
Amendment and Establishment Clause Considerations for the clergy privilege); Jacob M. 
Yellin, The History and Current Status of the Clergy-Penitent Privilege, 23 Santa Clara L. 
Rev. 95, 95–96 (1983) (discussing history). Other articles that do analyze state privilege law 
frequently focus on a single state or survey the statutes rather than case law interpreting 
them. See, e.g., Ronald J. Colombo, Forgive Us Our Sins: The Inadequacies of the Clergy-
Penitent Privilege, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 225, 231–34 (1998) (surveying state privilege 
statutes). 
14 Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 410 (1998). 
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without unnecessarily compromising the judiciary’s truth-finding 
function. 
I. THE CLERGY PRIVILEGE: ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION 
The clergy privilege, much like other privileges such as the attorney-
client privilege, is an evidentiary rule that shields certain 
communications—in this case spiritual, confidential communications—
from disclosure during litigation.15 In the United States, the privilege 
traces back to an 1811 New York decision.16 In People v. Smith, a trial 
court compelled a Protestant minister to testify about the defendant’s 
confidential admission17 after shielding a sacramental Catholic 
confession in an earlier case.18 In response to public outcry, the state’s 
legislature enacted a statutory privilege protecting confidential 
communications made to all clergy in their professional capacity.19 This 
statute served as a rough template for other states, spreading from West 
to Northeast, then finally to Southern states.20 All fifty states and the 
 
15 Imwinkelried, New Wigmore, supra note 4, § 1.3.8 (explaining how privileges work). 
16  The privilege’s pre-Reformation history is debated; the consensus recognizes that the 
privilege did not exist at common law. See, e.g., Lennard K. Whittaker, The Priest-Penitent 
Privilege: Its Constitutionality and Doctrine, 13 Regent U. L. Rev. 145, 146 (2000) (“While 
commonly accepted that the privilege existed in Catholic England, there is some 
disagreement as to how the priest-penitent privilege disappeared. Understandably, the 
privilege waned as the Anglican Church and other Protestant movements, which did not 
require auricular confessions, rose to prominence in England. Wigmore espouses that 
without question, after the restoration of the monarchy, no priest-penitent privilege existed at 
common law.” (footnotes omitted)); Yellin, supra note 13, at 95–108 (detailing the 
privilege’s history and development).  
17 N.Y. City Hall Rec. 77 (1817), reprinted in William F. Cahill, Mutations of the Rule of 
Fraud in Marriage, 1 Cath. Law. 185, 198 (1955); see also Yellin, supra note 13, at 106 
(briefly discussing the case). 
18 People v. Phillips, N.Y.C. Ct. Gen. Sess. (1813), reprinted in 1 W. L.J. 109, 109–13 
(1843). Phillips is one of the few decisions to exclude clergy communications on free 
exercise grounds. See Lori Lee Brocker, Note, Sacred Secrets: A Call for the Expansive 
Application and Interpretation of the Clergy-Communicant Privilege, 36 N.Y. L. Sch. L. 
Rev. 455, 480 (1991) (discussing the lack of constitutional litigation on the subject); 
Anthony Merlino, Note, Tightening the Seal: Protecting the Catholic Confessional from 
Unprotective Priest-Penitent Privileges, 32 Seton Hall L. Rev. 655, 675–709 (2002) (arguing 
for Free Exercise Clause “hybrid-rights” protections for the clergy privilege). 
19 2 N.Y. Rev. Stat. pt. III, ch. VII, tit. 3, art. 8, § 72 (1829) (since amended). 
20 See Walsh, supra note 4, at 1040 (“By the 1960s, through this gradual geographic 
embrace of fundamental human rights, the radical alternative of Philips [sic] had challenged 
and ultimately overthrown nationwide the archaic legal principles inherited from the colonial 
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District of Columbia now have clergy privilege statutes.21 While many 
of these statutes originally shielded confessions or religiously obligated 
communications,22 over time, almost all states expanded protection.23 
This is in stark contrast to other evidentiary rules, which have seen a 
“significant[] liberaliz[ing of] the admissibility of evidence” post–World 
War II.24 
These state statutes actively shape the federal privilege law. Rather 
than a specific clergy privilege, Congress instead passed Rule of 
 
regime. The last holdouts were in the Northeast (Connecticut, Maine, and New Hampshire), 
in the South (Alabama and Mississippi), and in Texas.”). 
21 Ala. Code § 12-21-166 (2012); Alaska R. Evid. 506; Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 12-2233 
(2016), 13-4062(3) (2010); Ark. R. Evid. 505; Cal. Evid. Code §§ 1030–34 (Deering 
2004); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-90-107(1)(c) (2017); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-146b (2015); Del. 
R. Evid. 505; D.C. Code § 14-309 (2001); Fla. Stat. § 90.505 (2016); Ga. Code. Ann. § 24-5-
502 (2013); Haw. R. Evid. 506; Idaho Code § 9-203(3) (2010); 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/8-803 
(2016); Ind. Code Ann. § 34-46-3-1(3) (LexisNexis 2008); Iowa Code § 622.10 (2017); Kan. 
Stat. Ann. § 60-429 (2005); Ky. R. Evid. Ann. 505; La. Stat. Ann. § 13:3734.2 (2006); La. 
Code Evid. Ann. art. 511 (2017); Me. R. Evid. 505; Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 9-
111 (LexisNexis 2013); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 233, § 20A (2016); Mass. R. Evid. 510; Mich. 
Comp. Laws Serv. §§ 600.2156 (LexisNexis 2004), 767.5a(2) (LexisNexis 2002); Minn. 
Stat. § 595.02(1)(c) (2016); Miss. Code Ann. § 13-1-22 (2012); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 491.060(4) 
(2016); Mont. Code Ann. § 26-1-804 (2015); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-506 (2016); Nev. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. § 49.255 (LexisNexis 2012); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 516:35 (2007); N.J. Stat. 
Ann. § 2A:84A-23 (West 2011); N.M. R. Evid. 11-506; N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 4505 (Consol. 
2003); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8-53.2 (2015); N.D. R. Evid. 505; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 
§ 2317.02(c) (LexisNexis 2017); Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 2505 (2011); Or. Rev. Stat. 
§ 40.260 (2015); 42 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5943 (West 2017); 9 R.I. Gen. Laws 
§ 9-17-23 (2012); S.C. Code Ann. § 19-11-90 (2014); S.D. Codified Laws § 19-19-505 
(2016); Tenn. Code. Ann. § 24-1-206 (2000); Tex. R. Evid. 505; Utah Code Ann. § 78B-1-
137(3) (LexisNexis 2012); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 1607 (2002); Va. Code Ann. §§ 8.01-400, 
19.2-271.3 (2015); Wash. Rev. Code § 5.60.060(3) (2016); W. Va. Code Ann. § 57-3-
9 (LexisNexis 2012); Wis. Stat. § 905.06 (2015–16); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-12-101(a)(ii) 
(2017). By the start of the twenty-first century, almost every state had enacted a clergy 
privilege statute, many of which legislatures subsequently amended to expand statutory 
protection. See, e.g., Merlino, supra note 18, at 699 n.86 (listing clergy privilege statutes 
enacted by 2002); see also infra Part III and accompanying notes (discussing these 
amendments).  
22 See, e.g., Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2317.02 (West 2000) (since amended); Vt. Stat. Ann. 
tit. 12, § 1607 (1973) (since amended); Crawford and Moses’ Digest of the Statutes of 
Arkansas, § 4148 (1927) (repealed). 
23 The New Jersey statute illustrates this evolution. Compare N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:81-9 
(West 1947) (protecting “a confession”), with N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:84A-23 (West 1960) 
(protecting “confessions and other communications made in confidence”). See also State v. 
J.G., 990 A.2d 1122, 1127–28 (N.J. 2010) (detailing the statute’s evolution). 
24 Imwinkelried, New Wigmore, supra note 4, § 1.1, at 5. 
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Evidence 501, a catch-all privilege, which states, “The common law—as 
interpreted by United States courts in the light of reason and 
experience—governs a claim of privilege.”25 Federal courts turn to state 
privilege decisions to interpret Rule 501.26 Further, under Rule 501, 
federal courts apply state privilege law in diversity and nonfederal 
question criminal cases.27 Consequently, federal clergy privilege 
decisions are scant.28 The Supreme Court only addressed the privilege in 
pre–Rule 501 dicta,29 and post–Rule 501 circuit court clergy decisions 
are limited.30 
 
25 Fed. R. Evid. 501. Initially, the Proposed Rules of Evidence and Model Rules of 
Evidence included a specific clergy privilege. See Rules of Evidence for the United States 
Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183 (1973); Model Code Evid. 219 (Am. Law Inst. 1942). 
The Proposed Rule was never adopted. See Introduction: The Development of Evidentiary 
Privileges in American Law, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1454, 1466 (1985). While the 1973 Proposed 
Rules debates challenged other privileges, they did not challenge the clergy privilege. See In 
re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374, 381 (3d Cir. 1990) (citation omitted); Stephen A. 
Saltzburg & Kenneth R. Redden, Federal Rules of Evidence Manual 333 (4th ed. 1986). 
Eleven statutes are fashioned from the Model Rules, twelve mirror Proposed Rule of 
Evidence 506, while the remainder are unique to the particular state. 
26 See, e.g., Varner v. Stovall, 500 F.3d 491, 496 (6th Cir. 2007) (relying on Michigan 
clergy privilege jurisprudence).  
27 Fed. R. Evid. 501; see also Fed. R. Evid. 501 advisory committee’s note (“It is intended 
that the State rules of privilege should apply equally in original diversity actions and 
diversity actions removed under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b).”); 19 Charles Alan Wright et al., 
Federal Practice and Procedure § 4512 (2d ed. 2002) (describing interaction between state 
and federal privilege and collecting cases). 
28 Since 1971, only twenty-three federal decisions addressed the clergy privilege. See, e.g., 
United States v. Dubé, 820 F.2d 886, 889 (7th Cir. 1987); Seidman v. Fishburne–Hudgins 
Educ. Found., 724 F.2d 413 (4th Cir. 1984); United States v. Gordon, 655 F.2d 478, 486 (2d 
Cir. 1981) (holding employee’s business communications to priest were not protected by 
priest-penitent privilege); United States v. Webb, 615 F.2d 828, 828 (9th Cir. 1980); 
Eckmann v. Bd. of Educ., 106 F.R.D. 70, 72 (E.D. Mo. 1985) (observing that “[t]he ‘priest-
penitent’ privilege has clearly been recognized by federal courts”). 
29 See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 906, 913 (1980) (analogizing the clergy and the 
adverse spousal testimonial privileges); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974) 
(“[A]n attorney or a priest may not be required to disclose what has been revealed in 
professional confidence.”); Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 107 (1875) (dismissing a 
secret agent’s contract claim, noting such claims “would require a disclosure of the 
confidences of the confessional”). 
30 The Third Circuit has expressly held the clergy privilege exists under Rule 501—a 
position other circuits have assumed. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374, 
377 (3d Cir. 1990); United States v. Dubé, 820 F.2d 886, 890 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that 
communications made to clergyman to avoid tax obligations were not privileged); United 
States v. Gordon, 655 F.2d 478, 486 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that defendant’s business 
communications to priest were not protected). 
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While variation exists,31 the common broad strokes for federal and 
state clergy privileges require a: (1) confidential, (2) spiritual 
communication, (3) made to a cleric in his professional capacity.32 The 
individual asserting the clergy privilege bears the burden.33 The privilege 
is absolute, meaning unlike a qualified privilege, a case-specific 
showing of a compelling need for the underlying information cannot 
override it.34 
Like other privileges, the clergy privilege furthers an “extrinsic social 
policy”35 deemed worthy of protection at a cost to justice. The loss of 
this testimony can “distort the record, mislead the factfinder, and 
undermine the central truth-seeking function of the courts.”36 To 
minimize this potential, privileges must be narrowly tailored to serve a 
particular social policy goal.37 
While agreeing on the “empirical assumption” underlying the 
privilege, courts and scholars debate the particular “extrinsic social 
 
31 Norman Abrams, Addressing the Tension Between the Clergy-Communicant Privilege 
and the Duty to Report Child Abuse in State Statutes, 44 B.C. L. Rev. 1127, 1133 (2003); 
Cassidy, supra note 5, at 1641; Colombo, supra note 13, at 232. 
32 Statutes phrase the requirements differently. Compare Ga. Code Ann. § 24-5-502 (1981) 
(privileging communications “made by any person professing religious faith, seeking 
spiritual comfort, or seeking counseling”), with Fla. Stat. § 90.505 (2017) (protecting 
communications made “for the purpose of seeking spiritual counsel and advice”). Further, 
some courts collapse the requirements or renumber them. Compare Roman Catholic 
Archbishop v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. Rptr. 3d 209, 229 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (listing three 
requirements), with Elliott v. State, 49 So. 3d 795, 799 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (listing 
four requirements). 
33 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374, 385 n.15 (3d Cir. 1990); People 
v. Schultz, 557 N.Y.S.2d 543, 545 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990). 
34 Imwinkelried, New Wigmore, supra note 4, § 1.2.1, at 13–14 (defining absolute and 
conditional privileges); see also Robert B. Gibbons, Evidence—Defendant Must Establish 
Relevancy Before Obtaining Access to Sexual Abuse Victim’s Privileged Records—
Commonwealth v. Bishop, 416 Mass. 169, 617 N.E.2d 990 (1993), 28 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 
243, 247 n.22 (1994) (same). 
35 Imwinkelried, New Wigmore, supra note 4, § 1.1, at 3. 
36 Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 413 (1998) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) 
(discussing the impact of privileges generally). 
37 See, e.g., Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976) (holding that a privilege 
should apply “only where necessary to achieve its purpose”); United States v. Nixon, 418 
U.S. 683, 710 (1974) (“[T]hese exceptions to the demand for every man’s evidence are not 
lightly created nor expansively construed, for they are in derogation of the search for 
truth.”). 
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policy” the privilege serves.38 For example, the traditional justification—
the one case law most references—focuses on the need to foster 
religious relationships by stimulating the growth of communications 
between clergy and communicants.39 This justification assumes a causal 
relationship: but for the privilege, people would be unwilling to share 
confidences with clergy.40 Thus, the privilege has little to no cost to 
justice. As Justice Stevens explains, “Without a privilege, much of the 
desirable evidence to which litigants such as [plaintiffs] seek 
access . . . is unlikely to come into being.”41 
Dean Wigmore, the seminal force behind evidence scholarship, is best 
known for advancing this justification. In doing so, Wigmore hoped to 
eliminate—or at least, significantly narrow—the slew of privileges he 
saw as obstructing justice.42 However, he viewed the clergy privilege as 
unique, believing it satisfied his four evaluative criteria necessary for an 
absolute privilege: 
(1) The clergy privilege involves communications that originate in 
a confidence that the communications will not be disclosed. 
(2) This element of confidentiality is essential to the full and 
satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties. 
(3) The clergy-communicant relationship is one which in the opinion 
of the community ought to be sedulously fostered. 
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the 
communications is greater than the benefit thereby gained for the 
correct disposal of litigation.43 
 
38 See generally Modes of Analysis: The Theories and Justifications of Privileged 
Communications, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1471 (1985) (discussing the competing theoretical 
justifications for privileges). 
39 26 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 5612 (2d ed. 2002). 
40 Id. 
41 Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1996) (applying the instrumental rationale to the 
psychotherapist privilege); accord Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 408 
(1998) (adopting similar rationale for attorney-client privilege). 
42 See 8 John Henry Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 2286, at 532, 
§ 2380a, at 72–73 (J. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961) (1904) [hereinafter Wigmore]; id. § 2192, 
at 72–73, § 2285, at 527. Jeremy Bentham equally questioned privileges while respecting the 
clergy privilege. 4 Jeremy Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence 589–91 (1827). 
43 See 8 Wigmore, supra note 42, §§ 2285, 2396; see also 8 John Henry Wigmore, 
Wigmore on Evidence § 2396, at 877 (John T. McNaughton ed., 1961) (asserting utilitarian 
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Though uncodified, these factors frequently appear in federal or state 
decisions.44 
Contemporary evidence scholars, in particular Professor Edward 
Imwinkelried, challenge this rationale as based on mere “empirical 
assumption.”45 He maintains religious individuals would engage in such 
communications regardless of the privilege.46 As he explains, “It is an 
insult to the sincerity of a fideist’s belief to argue that he or she will 
make a doctrinally required confession only if the legal system confers 
an evidentiary privilege on the confession.”47 
Imwinkelried, instead, posits autonomy and democratic rationales for 
privileges. On the autonomy front, privileges arguably advance personal 
decision making, permit emotional release, and promote self-
evaluation.48 On the democratic theory front, he contends society finds it 
“offensive” and “shocking” to compel such testimony.49 Still other 
scholars justify the privilege based on the assumption that, “Generally, 
ministers will not testify, regardless of what the trial judge says or does 
to them.”50 
 
and historical justifications). But see Walsh, supra note 4, at 1084 (criticizing Wigmore’s 
historical argument for the clergy privilege). 
44 See, e.g., Towbin v. Antonacci, 287 F.R.D. 672, 675 (S.D. Fla. 2012); State v. J.G., 990 
A.2d 1122, 1140 (N.J. 2010); Nicholson v. Wittig, 832 S.W.2d 681, 688 (Tex. App. 1992). 
45 Imwinkelried, New Wigmore, supra note 4, § 1.2.1, at 11–12 (“Many contemporary 
privilege rules rest on the empirical assumption that the rules cause the typical layperson to 
engage in desirable conduct . . . that supposedly would not occur but for the existence of an 
evidentiary privilege. On that assumption, the legal system’s recognition of evidentiary 
privileges comes cost free.”). 
46 Id. § 6.2.3, at 467–68. 
47 Id.; see also 1 George E. Dix et al., McCormick on Evidence § 76.2, at 139 (Kenneth S. 
Broun ed., 6th ed. 2006) (recognizing such communications occur “irrespective of the 
presence or absence of evidentiary privilege”). 
48 See Imwinkelried, New Wigmore, supra note 4, § 6.2.3, at 469 (“Indeed, the humanistic 
case for this privilege is stronger than the corresponding case for any other privilege. A 
person’s religious beliefs lie at the core of the decisional autonomy needed to develop his or 
her life plan.”). 
49 Imwinkelried, New Wigmore, supra note 4, § 6.2.3, at 470; see also Mary Harter 
Mitchell, Must Clergy Tell? Child Abuse Reporting Requirements Versus the Clergy 
Privilege and Free Exercise of Religion, 71 Minn. L. Rev. 723, 768 (1987) (“[T]here is [a] 
general repugnance at the law’s intrusion into such a relationship.”). 
50 Weldon Ponder, Will Your Pastor Tell?, Liberty Mag., May-June 1978, at 3. Still others 
contend existing privileges are not so much rooted in encouraging communication or 
protecting privacy but rather reflect political power by groups who have sought and obtained 
special treatment. See, e.g., Eric D. Green & Charles R. Nesson, Problems, Cases, and 
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While case law echoes these varied rationales,51 the traditional, 
Wigmorean justification remains primary.52 Further, despite their 
differences, these various rationales share a common outcome: an 
absolute, broadly construed clergy privilege, assumed essential to serve 
political or societal gains.53 
II. UNDERSTANDING THE CLERGY PRIVILEGE: SURVEY AND RESULTS 
Testing the Wigmorean “empirical assumption” requires a macro 
understanding of the privilege in application. This includes the 
privilege’s most litigated requirements, temporal trends, and 
transsubstantive application. An exhaustive analysis of clergy privilege 
decisions provides such an understanding.54 This Part starts with the 
specifics of this exhaustive case law survey and its surprising results. 
Rather than a privilege afforded judicial respect, the survey finds a 
dying privilege. Even more interesting, though, is the role of clergy in 
this decline. Existing empirical work on clergy and confidentiality, 
though discrete, depicts clergy strictly beholden to their perceived 
obligation to maintain confidences.55 However, as this Part goes on to 
 
Materials on Evidence 526 (1983); see also Modes of Analysis, supra note 38, at 1471 
(discussing competing rationales). 
51 See, e.g., Simpson v. Tennant, 871 S.W.2d 301, 308 (Tex. App. 1994) (citations 
omitted) (discussing how the privilege benefits privacy, freedom of religion, the prestige of 
religious institutions, and avoids judicial versus canonical strife).  
52 See, e.g., Waters v. O’Connor, 103 P.3d 292, 296 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004) (justifying the 
privilege on the basis of individuals’ need to speak in “total and absolute confidence”); 
Purdum v. Purdum, 301 P.3d 718, 737 (Kan. Ct. App. 2013) (“The evidentiary privilege 
extends to parties and witnesses to advance public policy objectives in maintaining 
confidentiality for communications essential to a relationship society deems worthy of 
protection.”); McFarland v. W. Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses, Lorain, Ohio, Inc., 60 
N.E.3d 39, 46 (Ohio Ct. App. 2016) (same). 
53 Case law and scholars routinely characterize the privilege as absolute. See, e.g., In re 
Lifschutz, 2 Cal.3d 415, 427–29 (1970); Misenheimer v. Burris, 183 N.C. App. 408, 412 
(2007); 81 Am. Jr. 2d Witnesses § 493 (2006); Cassidy, supra note 5, at 1674 (“[U]nlike 
other professional privileges, the clergy-penitent privilege, when applicable, is considered 
absolute.”). 
54 All data is on file with author and available upon request. See Bartholomew Clergy Data 
(Jan. 17, 2017) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association). This data includes all 
available federal and state clergy privilege cases, identified either as a statutory annotation or 
by searching “clergy” /s “privilege.” In states where the privilege is broken into multiple 
statutes, annotations to each statute were included. See, e.g., Cal. Evid. Code §§ 1030–34 
(Deering 2004). 
55 See Elizabeth Audette, 115.3 The Christian Century 80 (1998). 
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explain, this hypothetical obligation does not translate to actual 
scenarios. Rather, clergy’s testimony and pre-litigation conduct for three 
key privilege requirements supports a more qualified, more restricted 
privilege. 
A. Survey Details 
 As previously detailed in Part I, current clergy privilege statutes 
provide generous protection. For example, statutes define clergy 
expansively to include priests, rabbis, ordained or licensed ministers of 
any church, and accredited Christian Science practitioners in all fifty 
states.56 Six state statutes also protect any persons authorized to perform 
similar functions of any religion.57 Additionally, every state now 
safeguards more communications beyond sacramental confessions, 
ranging from spiritual advice to communications of comfort.58 States’ 
expanded coverage triggered a corresponding rise in the number of 
assertions in written decisions, as depicted in Figure 1. From 1835 to 
1980, there were only 63 reported clergy privilege decisions. By the end 
of the 1990s, that number grew to 175. By December 2016, the end date 
of this survey, 324 written opinions squarely decided a clergy privilege 
assertion.59 
Figure 1 
 
56 See, e.g., Ala. Code § 12-21-166(a)(1) (2012); Alaska R. Evid. 506; Ariz. Rev. Stat. 
§§ 12-2233 (2016), 13-4062(3) (2010); Ark. R. Ev. 505(a)(1); Cal. Evid. Code §§ 1030–34; 
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-90-107(1)(c) (2017); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-146b (2015); Del R. Evid. 
505(a)(1). 
57 See, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. § 24-5-502 (2013); Ky. R. Evid. Ann. 505(a)(1); La. Code 
Evid. Ann. art. 511(A)(1) (2017); Miss. R. Evid. 506(a)(1); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:84A-23 
(West 2011); Utah R. Evid. 503(a)(1). 
58 What is “more” varies from state to state, but often includes spiritual advice, solace, or 
comfort. See, e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 233 § 20A (2016) (“religious or spiritual advice or 
comfort”); Minn. Stat. § 595.02 (2016) (“religious or spiritual advice, aid, or comfort”); Mo. 
Rev. St. 491.060 (2016) (advice, confession, comfort); N.M. R. Evid. 11-506 (advice).  
59 This number is a subset of the total reviewed decisions. It excludes dicta or remand 
decisions.  
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Criminal cases outnumbered civil ones almost two to one.60 Murder 
cases most frequently trigger an assertion of privilege, with sex crimes a 
close second, as shown in Figure 2.61 
Figure 2 
 
 
 
Successful assertion of the privilege is an increasing rarity. Figure 3 
illustrates how this decline began in the 1980s, picked back up slightly 
in the 1990s, then dropped again in 2000.62 Between 2000 and 2016, the 
percent of clergy privilege assertions granted fell to a low of twenty-six 
percent. 
 
60 See Bartholomew Clergy Data, supra note 54 (recording 219 criminal decisions and 105 
civil claims).  
61 Sex crimes include: sexual abuse, rape, sexual assault, sexual misconduct, crimes 
against nature, indecent contact with children, child molestation, lewd conduct, sexual 
harassment, and bigamy. Personal crimes include: manslaughter, child abuse, assault, threat 
of force, police misconduct, mutilation of a deceased body, and wrongful death. Property 
crimes include: fraud, burglary, theft, damages claims, forgery, robbery, embezzlement, 
arson, and armed robbery. The “family” category includes: divorce, child custody, alienation 
of affection, parental custody, termination of parental rights, and paternity. 
62 Pre-1900s, the courts denied the privilege seventy-one percent of the time, but this 
figure is based on only seven written decisions. By the 1950s, this number was seventy-eight 
percent, based solely on twenty-three written decisions. To minimize statistical sample size 
issues, this Article concentrates on current trends. 
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Figure 3 
Viewed separately, courts appear less willing to apply the privilege in 
criminal cases, where courts deny the privilege seventy-five percent of 
the time, versus civil cases, where the overall denial rate is fifty-five 
percent. However, while courts historically afforded the privilege more 
deference in civil cases, currently criminal and civil cases are more 
closely aligned, as reflected in Figure 4. 
Figure 4 
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This temporal tracking does not encompass cases where judges 
summarily address the privilege. Nor can it reflect any decision by 
counsel to avoid calling clergy in the first place. It does, however, 
indicate which statutory requirements trigger litigation. Scholars 
predicted litigation over the “clergy” requirement.63 However, it has 
actually generated minimal conflict, likely because most standards 
define clergy expansively.64 Similarly, ownership and waiver are fairly 
 
63 See, e.g., Colombo, supra note 13, at 232 (discussing how a lack of clear statutory 
definition would “generate needless litigation over this issue”). 
64 Thirty-nine states have adopted a generous definition of clergy, protecting 
communications to “a priest, minister, religious practitioner, or similar functionary of a 
church or of a religious denomination or religious organization.” Ala. Code § 12-21-166 
(2012); Alaska R. Evid. 506; Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4062(3) (2010); Ark. R. Evid. 505; 
Cal. Evid. Code § 1030 (Deering 2004); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-90-107(1)(c) (2017); 
Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-146b (2015); Del. R. Evid. 505; D.C. Code § 14-309 (2001); Fla. 
Stat. § 90.505 (2016); Ga. Code. Ann. § 24-5-502 (2013); Haw. R. Evid. 506; Idaho Code 
§ 9-203(3) (2010); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-429 (2005); Ky. R. Evid. Ann. 505; La. Code Evid. 
Ann. art. 511 (2017); Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 9-111 (LexisNexis 2013); Mass. 
Gen. Laws ch. 233, § 20A (2016); Mass. R. Evid. 510; Mich. Comp. Laws Serv. § 767.5a(2) 
(LexisNexis 2002); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 491.060(4) (2016); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-506 (2016); 
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 516:35 (2007); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:84A-23 (West 2011); N.M. R. 
Evid. 11-506; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8-53.2 (2015); N.D. R. Evid. 505; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 
§ 2317.02(C)(2)(a) (LexisNexis 2017); Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 2505 (2011); 42 Pa. Stat. and 
Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5943 (West 2017); 9 R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-17-23 (2012); S.C. Code Ann. 
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well settled. The vast majority of jurisdictions grant the communicant 
ownership of the privilege.65 Further, most jurisdictions find the 
privilege waived when a communicant fails to object, fails to take 
reasonable precautions, shares the content of the communication with a 
third party, or proactively waives the privilege in court.66 
As depicted in Figure 5, when a court denies the privilege, it is 
usually because the proponent fails to establish: (1) the cleric acted in 
his professional capacity, (2) there was a spiritual communication, or (3) 
the communication was confidential. In analyzing clergy privilege 
decisions, one pattern quickly emerges: courts rely heavily on clergy 
testimony for these requirements. 
Figure 5 
 
§ 19-11-90 (2014); S.D. Codified Laws § 19-19-505 (2016); Tenn. Code Ann. § 24-1-
206 (2000); Utah Code Ann. § 78B-1-137(3) (LexisNexis 2012); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, 
§ 1607 (2002); Va. Code Ann. §§ 8.01-400, 19.2-271.3 (2015); W. Va. Code Ann. § 57-3-9 
(LexisNexis 2012); Wis. Stat. § 905.06 (2015–16). 
65 The communicant owns the privilege in all but six states. See Ala. R. Evid. 505; Cal. 
Evid. Code §§ 912, 917, 1030–34 (Deering 2004); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-90-107(1)(c) 
(2017); Miss. Code Ann. § 13-1-22 (2012); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:84A-23 (West 2011); Or. 
Rev. Stat. § 40.260 (2015). Thirty-five statutes spell out this ownership, while case law 
settles the question in the remaining states. 
66 See, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. § 9-11-34 (2015) (failure to object); Haw. R. Evid. 511 (third 
party); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 4505 (Consol. 2003) (court waiver); Utah R. Evid. 510(a) 
(reasonable precautions). Waiver—generally meaning whether either the communicant or 
the cleric disclosed the information to a third party—is also a frequent ground for denying 
the privilege. However, waiver issues are often governed by separate statutes and thus are 
beyond the scope of this Article. See, e.g., La. Code Evid. Ann. art. 502 (2017); Mass. Guide 
to Evid. § 523; N.M. R. Evid. 11-511. 
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The next Sections detail how this testimony challenges the need for an 
absolute privilege.67 
B. The Professional Capacity Requirement 
Every state limits the clergy privilege to communications that occur in 
the cleric’s professional capacity as a spiritual advisor.68 Communicants 
asserting the privilege uniformly contend clergy were acting in their 
professional capacity. In contrast, as discussed below, clergy define 
professional capacity more narrowly, not always convincingly 
distinguishing their spiritual and other religious work. Not only do these 
more restrictive characterizations contribute to the privilege’s decline, 
they also impugn the “empirical assumption” that an absolute, broad 
clergy privilege is essential to “sedulously foster[]”69 religious 
relationships—at least not to clergy. 
 
67 This is not to say that courts always defer to clergy. On rare occasion, courts have 
upheld the privilege even when the clergy was willing to testify. See, e.g., Mullen v. United 
States, 263 F.2d 275, 276–77 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (Fahy, J., concurring) (finding privilege in 
child abuse case where Lutheran minister encouraged defendant to confess but was 
subsequently willing to testify at trial about the spiritual confession). 
68 This element is uniform across the states, though not every statute catalogues it. 
Compare, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. § 24-5-502 (2013) (no codified professional capacity 
requirement), with, e.g., 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/8-803 (2016) (codified professional capacity 
requirement). 
69 8 Wigmore, supra note 42, §§ 2285, 2396 (footnote omitted).  
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As clergy delineate their roles as spiritual advisors, the boundaries of 
what responsibilities fall within “professional capacity” vary. However, 
case law indicates a cleric is more likely to disclose: (1) conversations 
with employees, (2) discussions with friends, and (3) exchanges 
regarding factual investigations. 
First, with employees or other church staff, clergy define their 
professional capacity narrowly, even though the line between employer 
and spiritual advisor can blur. For example, in Bonds v. State,70 the 
witness, Brown, was a local minister and owner of the air conditioning 
business where the defendant, Bonds, worked. Bonds occasionally 
attended Brown’s church and had previously sought ministering from 
Brown. Nonetheless, for the conversation at issue, which involved 
allegations of sexual misconduct, Brown “testified without contradiction 
that he made the call as Bonds’ employer” without distinguishing this 
conversation from prior counseling sessions.71 The Supreme Court of 
Arkansas upheld the trial court’s wholesale reliance on Brown’s 
characterization, finding the privilege did not apply because Brown was 
not acting in his “capacity as a spiritual advisor.”72 
Second, clergy frequently treat their ministerial capacity as mutually 
exclusive from their roles as friends, even when the two commingle.73 
The Court of Appeals of Iowa addressed this issue in State v. 
McCurdy.74 McCurdy was convicted of sexual abuse, in part based on 
the testimony of his longtime friend and pastor, Acker. During a phone 
call, McCurdy told Acker he was under investigation and then detailed 
his transgressions. The two then prayed together and explored 
McCurdy’s desire to be baptized. Acker advised McCurdy “to seek God 
and to give [his] life and heart over to God and ask for God’s help with 
this matter.” At the end of the conversation, McCurdy, at Acker’s 
 
70 837 S.W.2d 881 (Ark. 1992).  
71 Id. at 883. 
72 Id. at 884. 
73 But see, e.g., State v. Boling, 806 S.W.2d 202, 204 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990) (finding 
privilege because clergy testified “he didn’t distinguish between being the defendant’s 
minister or friend on that occasion”). On rare occasion, a court rejects a cleric’s delineation 
between friend and spiritual advisor. See, e.g., Tankersley v. State, 724 So. 2d 557, 561 (Ala. 
Crim. App. 1998) (disregarding pastor’s claim the conversation with defendant occurred 
outside her professional capacity because her “status as a pastor influenced the appellant’s 
decision to telephone her”). 
74 823 N.W.2d 418, 2012 WL 4901158 (Iowa Ct. App. 2012). 
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urging, accepted “Christ as his savior.” Nonetheless, Acker testified the 
conversation fell outside his professional capacity, stating: 
I am a pastor, but I’m also a spiritual man, a man who loves God 
dearly. And so . . . as I’m talking to my sister or to my other 
friends . . . my parents even, I regularly offer spiritual guidance and 
advice. So to say that because I was offering him some spiritual advice 
that I was doing that in my ministerial capacity, I would definitely 
have to say no.75 
Relying on this testimony, the court discounted the conversation’s 
religious nature, agreeing that Acker did not act in his professional 
capacity.76 Thus, once again, clergy testimony barred the privilege. 
Third, and perhaps more notable, are cases where clergy distinguish 
their roles as disciplinarians,77 confronters,78 informants,79 mediators,80 
or even neutral bystanders81 from their religious professional capacity. 
These distinctions frequently arise when congregants are accused of or 
are victims of abuse.82 
 
75 Id. at *3 (alterations in original). 
76 Id. 
77 See, e.g., Kos v. State, 15 S.W.3d 633, 639–40 (Tex. App. 2000) (finding lack of 
professional capacity because “Father Broderick testified that, at the time of the meeting, he 
was not concerned about the ‘state of [appellant’s] soul’; rather, he described the meeting as 
a ‘disciplinary intervention’” (alteration in original)). 
78 Fahlfeder v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 470 A.2d 1130, 1132–33 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
1984) (discussing how reverend did not act in his professional capacity in confronting 
defendant about abuse allegations); Maldonado v. State, 59 S.W.3d 251, 253 (Tex. App. 
2001) (denying privilege based on cleric’s representation that “the specific purpose of the 
meetings was to confront him about the allegations of his inappropriate behavior”). 
79 See, e.g., State v. Jackson, No. M2000-00763-CCA-R3-CD, 2001 WL 812254, at *7 
(Tenn. Crim. App. July 18, 2001) (denying privilege where cleric acted as an informant, not 
as a spiritual advisor). 
80 See, e.g., State v. Scoggins, 70 So. 3d 145, 149 (La. Ct. App. 2011), writ denied sub 
nom. State v. Scoggin, 79 So. 3d 1033, 1033 (La. 2012). 
81 See, e.g., State v. Mark R., 17 A.3d 1, 6 (Conn. 2011); State v. Latham, No. E2006-
02262-CCA-R3CD, 2008 WL 748381, at *20 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 20, 2008). 
82 This narrowing lacks uniformity. Compare, e.g., People v. Campobello, 810 N.E.2d 307, 
312 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (illustrating how some clerics view investigating sexual abuse 
allegations as part of their professional responsibility as a spiritual advisor), with, e.g., State 
v. Hesse, 767 N.W.2d 420, 2009 WL 776530, at *5 (Iowa Ct. App. 2009) (distinguishing 
clerics’ role as spiritual advisor from investigator). 
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Magar v. State,83 a criminal case involving allegations of sexual abuse 
by a church member, highlights this overlap. Reverend Rowe, a witness 
in the case, had many prior counseling sessions with the appellant. The 
Reverend testified it was his practice “to keep 
confidential . . . information gained in a counseling relationship.” 
Similarly, the appellant testified that the Reverend assured him “their 
conversations were private.”84 The Reverend testified he “confronted” 
Magar after allegations that he sexually abused two boys. At trial, the 
Reverend framed the conversation as “disciplinary in nature.”85 This 
framing helped the Supreme Court of Arkansas sweep aside the 
Reverend’s original promise to Magar of nondisclosure.86 Rather, the 
court allowed the testimony, holding the conversation took place outside 
the Reverend’s professional capacity.87 
Clergy maintain this constricted definition of professional capacity 
even though in many cases such conversations begin as confrontations 
but evolve into confessions, and sometimes even spiritual repentance. 
For example, in Gutierrez v. State, a priest confronted the defendant 
about his daughter’s allegations of sexual abuse.88 After contacting the 
police, Father Minifie called Gutierrez. During this conversation, 
Gutierrez confessed and sought spiritual guidance on how to move 
forward. The conversation was overtly religious, as the two discussed 
reading the Bible and the need to “let the Lord take care of this 
situation.”89 At trial, the priest “testified that the purpose of the call was 
not to provide spiritual advice, and he was not calling in the capacity of 
a spiritual advisor.”90 Relying on this restrictive interpretation of a 
clergy’s professional capacity, the court denied the privilege.91 This 
decision, too, shows clergy’s testimony challenging the need for a broad, 
absolute privilege. 
Professional capacity is not the only requirement where clergy 
testimony challenges the Wigmorean empirical assumption. As 
 
83 826 S.W.2d 221 (Ark. 1992). 
84 Id. at 222. 
85 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
86 Id. at 225 (Newbern, J., dissenting). 
87 Id. at 223. 
88 No. 01-09-00939-CR, 2010 WL 4484350, at *1 (Tex. App. Nov. 10, 2010). 
89 Id. at *1–2. 
90 Id. at *2. 
91 Id. at *1. 
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discussed next, this testimony suggests fewer communications need 
protection. 
C. The Protected Communication Requirement 
Clergy testimony also undercuts the traditional justification that an 
absolute privilege is “essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance 
of the relationship between the parties.”92 Originally, the privilege only 
protected sacramental confessions,93 recognizing that Catholic priests 
who broke such sacraments faced excommunication.94 Other religions 
do not view oral confession as a sacrament, or they permit a 
communicant to confess directly to God without a priest intermediary.95 
Rather than foreclose the privilege to non-Catholics, states expanded 
coverage to more than sacramental confessions. What additional 
communications are protected varies, as some states privilege all 
religiously required communications and others go further. With either 
approach, though, clergy testimony chips at the scope of potentially 
privileged communications. 
First, some statutes now shield any communications necessary under 
a religious tenet.96 This limitation frequently appears as statutory 
 
92 8 Wigmore, supra note 42, § 2285 (footnote omitted). 
93 Confession is one of seven Catholic sacraments. General Council of Trent, Seventh 
Session, Decree on the Sacraments, Canon I, No. 1311 (1547), reprinted in J. Neuner, S.J. & 
J. Dupois, S.J., The Christian Faith: In the Doctrinal Documents of the Catholic Church 522 
(Jacques Dupuis ed., 6th ed. 1998); see also Kevin Orlin Johnson, Why Do Catholics Do 
That?: A Guide to the Teachings and Practices of the Catholic Church 214–15 (1994) (listing 
“Baptism, Confirmation, the Eucharist, Reconciliation, Matrimony, Holy Orders, and the 
Anointing of the Sick”). 
94 The Code of Canon Law 246, Can. 1388, § 1 (1983); see, e.g., Andrew A. Beerworth, 
Treating Spiritual and Legal Counselors Differently: Mandatory Reporting Laws and the 
Limitations of Current Free Exercise Doctrine, 10 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 73, 105–06 
(2004) (detailing the importance of confession in Catholic faith). 
95 This is true for Protestantism and Judaism, for example. See, e.g., William Harold 
Tiemann & John C. Bush, The Right to Silence: Privileged Clergy Communication and the 
Law 23 (1983); Chad Horner, Beyond the Confines of the Confessional: The Priest-Penitent 
Privilege in a Diverse Society, 45 Drake L. Rev. 697, 698 (1997). 
96 Courts disagree whether the “discipline-enjoined” requirement also requires cross-
referencing religious tenets. Compare Nussbaumer v. State, 882 So. 2d 1067, 1076 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (“Although the interpretation of the discipline enjoined requirement is 
by no means uniform, the modern trend is to interpret it as requiring only that the confider 
consulted the clergy member in his or her professional capacity.”), with State v. Martin, 975 
P.2d 1020, 1025 (Wash.  1999) (quoting Wash. Rev. Code § 5.60.060 (1995)) (interpreting 
the phrase “confession [made] . . . in the course of discipline enjoined by the church” to 
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language privileging communications “in the course of discipline 
enjoined by the church to which he belongs.”97 This “discipline-
enjoined” restriction affords clergy significant, frequently outcome-
determinative influence, as courts maintain it is not their “role to decide 
what types of communications constitute confessions within the 
meaning of a particular religion.”98 While over two-thirds of the clergy 
decisions involve Protestants, even in cases involving Judaism, Santeria, 
and Islam, courts have favored clergy testimony to determine whether a 
particular conversation was spiritual—despite contrary evidence from 
the communicant.99 
Even for sacramental confessions, clergy adopt a case-specific 
approach, rejecting any categorical definition of a privileged 
communication. For example, in one case a Catholic priest received 
confession of a murder for which two others were convicted and 
sentenced. The priest, Father Towle, provided absolution for 
wrongdoing but struggled for years regarding whether to break the seal 
of confession and risk excommunication by sharing this information to 
avoid the continued incarceration of two innocent men. With the 
assistance of officials at the diocese, the priest decided he could share 
the confessed communication after all. Rather than maintaining it was a 
sacramental confession, the priest revised his view with the assistance of 
 
mean a cleric’s doctrinal obligations to hear a confidence, not a parishioner’s obligation to 
confide), and State v. Price, 881 A.2d 1082, 1085 (Del. Super. Ct. 2005) (collapsing 
Pennsylvania’s “discipline-enjoined” and “professional capacity” requirements). See also 
Cassidy, supra note 13, at 1640–44 (discussing the conflicting interpretations of the 
“discipline enjoined” requirement in some state clergy privilege statutes). 
97 See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-4062(3) (2010); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-90-107(1)(c) (2017); 
D.C. Code § 14-309 (2001); Fla. Stat. § 90.505 (2016); 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/8-803 (2016); 
Ind. Code Ann. § 34-46-3-1(3) (LexisNexis 2008); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 233, § 20A (2016); 
Mich. Comp. Laws Serv. § 767.5a(2) (LexisNexis 2002); Minn. Stat. § 595.02(1)(c) (2016); 
Mont. Code Ann. § 26-1-804 (2015); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:84A-23 (West 2011); 9 R.I. Gen. 
Laws § 9-17-23 (2012); Va. Code Ann. §§ 19.2-271.3, 8.01-400 (2015); W. Va. Code Ann. 
§ 57-3-9 (LexisNexis 2012); cf. Cassidy, supra note 5, at 1642 n.77 (“So entrenched is the 
‘discipline enjoined’ requirement in the history of the privilege that some courts cite it as a 
prerequisite to the application of the privilege, notwithstanding the fact that the statute that 
they are construing contains no such language.”).  
98 State v. Martin, 959 P.2d 152, 156 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998), aff’d, 975 P.2d 1020 (Wash. 
1999). 
99 See, e.g., People v. Drelich, 506 N.Y.S.2d 746, 748 (App. Div. 1986) (Judaism); State v. 
Gil, No. 2 CA–CR 2013–0508, 2014 WL 4725805, at *1, *4 (Ariz. Ct. App. Sept. 23, 2014) 
(Santeria); People v. Johnson, 497 N.Y.S.2d 539, 540 (App. Div. 1985) (Islam). 
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the Archdiocese, describing the communication as a “heart-to-heart,” 
thus taking it outside the context of a sacramental confession. In 
affirming this characterization, the Southern District of New York 
pointed out it was “in no position to second-guess Father Towle or the 
Archdiocese in this respect.”100 
Other jurisdictions reject the “discipline-enjoined” requirement. 
Figure 6 depicts how, facially, these state statutes privilege confidential 
communications,101 “religious or spiritual advice or comfort,”102 or—
more generally—“any communication” that otherwise satisfies the 
statute.103 
Figure 6 
 
 
 
While many decisions apply this broad coverage literally,104 others adopt 
more fact-specific approaches to define the communications 
requirement.105 
 
100 Morales v. Portuondo, 154 F. Supp. 2d 706, 729 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
101 See, e.g., Ala. R. Evid. 505.  
102 See, e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 233, § 20A (2016).  
103 See, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:84A-23 (West 2011); see also Horner, supra note 95, at 
729–30 (“Today . . . the privilege is extended to protect conversations between spiritual 
leaders of non-Catholic Western religious groups and followers of those religions.”). 
104 See, e.g., Tankersley v. State, 724 So. 2d 557, 560 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998) (covering 
more than just penitential communication); Reardon v. Savill, No. CV 950546948, 1999 WL 
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In this absence of a clear demarcation, clergy have resisted the 
privilege in scenarios that facially fall within statutory protection. This 
more restrictive view means clergy have willingly testified when part of 
the conversation is not spiritual, even if the remainder of the 
communication is overtly religious.106 
In this way, clergy have identified a narrower category of 
communications they are willing to withhold from the eyes of the law 
than the wide swath of communications privileged by statute. Much like 
how clergy distinguish their other roles from their professional capacity, 
clergy delineate spiritual conversations as mutually exclusive from 
discussions of “family problems,”107 investigations,108 or “disciplinary” 
 
1063195, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 4, 1999) (covering “solace”); Commonwealth v. 
Nutter, 28 N.E.3d 1, 3 (Mass. App. Ct. 2015) (covering “rules or practice of the religious 
body to which [the cleric] belongs”), review denied, 35 N.E.3d 721 (Mass. 2015); People v. 
Bragg, 824 N.W.2d 170, 182 (Mich. Ct. App. 2012) (covering “any communication”); 
Congregation B’Nai Jonah v. Kuriansky, 576 N.Y.S.2d 934, 936 (App. Div. 1991) (covering 
“counsel, advice, solace, absolution or ministration”). 
105 Judicial treatment of pastoral counseling highlights this tension. Compare Nussbaumer 
v. State, 882 So. 2d 1067, 1077 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (“[T]here are probably many 
instances in which it would be difficult to distinguish a call to personal growth based on a 
spiritual message from one that is only psychotherapeutic in origin . . . . Fortunately, 
[Florida’s clergy privilege statute] does not require the courts to assess the spiritual content 
of the clergy member’s response to the confider’s request for spiritual advice and counsel.”), 
with Brown v. State, 964 A.2d 516, 540–41 (R.I. 2009) (probing beyond the representation 
that the communication was pastoral counseling to segregate secular from nonsecular 
communications). 
106 See, e.g., State v. McCary, No. 03C01-9303-CR-00103, 1994 WL 176972, at *7 (Tenn. 
Crim. App. May 11, 1994) (noting the pastor “sought to minister,” but defendant did not 
seek spiritual advice), rev’d on other grounds, 922 S.W.2d 511 (Tenn. 1996); Snyder v. 
State, 68 S.W.3d 671, 675 (Tex. App. 2000) (accepting youth director’s characterization of 
the communication as not privileged even though director conceded the conversation 
“involved God and religion”). This difference is not universal. See, e.g., State v. J.G., 990 
A.2d 1122, 1124 (N.J. 2010); EMC, LLC v. Cooper, No. F–46467–08, 2012 WL 5381688, at 
*10 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2012) (referencing the cleric’s willingness to testify but 
disregarding it). 
107 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Kebreau, 909 N.E.2d 1146, 1159 (Mass. 2009) 
(characterizing the conversation at issue as a “family issue”); State v. Cardenas, No. A13-
0775, 2014 WL 1516335, at *5 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 21, 2014) (holding a discussion of a 
family problem not to be covered by the privilege). 
108 See, e.g., State v. Tart, 672 So. 2d 116, 143 (La. 1996) (denying privilege based on 
minister’s statement that he was “visiting Tart . . . to question him as to whether his civil 
rights were violated,” not to engage in spiritual communications, despite praying together); 
State v. Weeks, 858 N.W.2d 36, 2014 WL 5243359, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. 2014) (“[The 
pastor] testified at a hearing that he and [defendant] did not talk about religious matters, but 
they were ‘two cycling buddies talking.’”).  
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discussions.109 In other cases, clergy testify that the communicant was 
not confessing but “trying to explain his side of the story”110 or “popping 
off.”111 
For example, in State v. Cartmell, the chaplain witness testified about 
a communication with the defendant in a murder case.112 The chaplain 
had accompanied the police and the defendant on a car ride to the 
victim’s mother’s house. During the ride and at the scene, the defendant 
told the chaplain details about the murder. According to the defendant, 
he and the chaplain prayed together at the scene, though the chaplain 
denied this. While the chaplain acknowledged he was there in his 
professional capacity, he maintained the communication was not 
spiritual but rather an opportunity for the defendant to “try[] to make 
peace, [to make] sense of what happened.”113 Relying on this 
characterization, the court found the privilege did not apply.114 
Similarly, in State v. Hancock, the defendant had several 
conversations with his pastor in which he admitted that he had been the 
last person to see the murder victim alive.115 The pastor maintained that 
“no spiritual counseling took place during that conversation,”116 despite 
acknowledging he offered spiritual counsel at other times and that 
 
109 Magar, 826 S.W.2d at 222–23 (finding privilege inapplicable to defendant’s admission 
to minister’s accusation of sexual abuse of minors where minister initiated conversation for 
disciplinary, not spiritual, counseling). 
110 Elliott v. State, 49 So. 3d 795, 799 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (“According to elder 
Westbrook, appellant did not indicate that he was seeking spiritual counseling and guidance 
and did not want to talk about the Bible or pray. The trial court could conclude that 
appellant’s words and actions indicated that he was not seeking spiritual advice or 
counseling, but was trying to explain his side of the story.”). 
111 See, e.g., In re W.B.W., No. 11–11–00269–CV, 2012 WL 2856067, at *15 (Tex. App. 
July 12, 2012) (finding lack of privilege based on Pastor’s testimony that defendant “merely 
began ‘popping off’ with a sexually explicit story”). 
112 No. M2012-01925-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 3056164, at *23–25 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 
7, 2014). 
113 Id. at *26. 
114 Id. 
115 No. M2012-02307-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 7006969, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 12, 
2014), appeal denied (May 14, 2015). 
116 Id. at *5; cf. Mitchell, supra note 49, at 748 (discussing the challenges of characterizing 
spiritual counseling since “the content of counseling sessions often includes many 
theoretically distinguishable types of confidential disclosure, including, for example, 
statements of the confider’s past conduct, confessions, expressions of penitence, expressions 
of anger and other deeply felt emotions, solicitations of advice, personal background 
information, and statements about the wrongdoing of others”). 
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during the conversation at issue,117 he advised the defendant to “open 
up” about the murder so the defendant “could ask for forgiveness.”118 
Without interrogating the pastor’s representation, the Tennessee Court 
of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of the privilege.119 
This narrowing is particularly apparent when clergy perceive the 
communicant is insufficiently contrite or using the clergy. In many 
religions, confession requires something more than getting something 
off your chest—a type of confession “plus,” so to speak.120 This “plus” 
is repentance, meaning a desire to make amends or change one’s ways. 
In fact, there are strong canonical reasons to consider contrition.121 
Nonetheless, existing statutes have no such requirement. Yet privilege 
decisions reveal repeated instances where clergy treat patently 
confessional speech as nonprivileged because they perceive the 
communicant is not repentant.122 Responding to clergy’s 
characterizations, judicial decisions have turned on this distinction.123 
For example, the Massachusetts appellate court decision in 
Commonwealth v. Nutter shows clergy refusing to shield verbal 
“comfort”—a category of protected communication under the privilege 
 
117 Hancock, 2014 WL 7006969, at *5. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. at *1. 
120 See, e.g., Presbyterian Church in Am., The Westminster Confession of Faith 15:3 
(“Although repentance be not to be rested in, as any satisfaction for sin, or any cause of the 
pardon thereof, which is the act of God’s free grace in Christ; yet it is of such necessity to all 
sinners, that none may expect pardon without it.”); Pinchas H. Peli, On Repentance: In the 
Thought and Oral Discourses of Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik 235 (2000) (discussing the 
interrelationship between confession and repentance in Orthodox Judaism). 
121 This focus on repentance traces back to Jeremy Bentham, who tied repentance to the 
clergy privilege: “Repentance, and consequent abstinence from further misdeeds of the like 
nature; repentance, followed even by satisfaction in some shape or other, satisfaction more 
or less adequate for the past: such are the well-known consequences of [clergy-penitent 
communication].” Bentham, supra note 42, at 590. 
122 See, e.g., Parnell v. State, 581 S.E.2d 263, 267 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) (relying on cleric 
(defendant’s father’s) testimony “that he did not start ministering to his son until after he was 
arrested, which was after the [confessions] were made”); State v. Cardenas, No. A13–0775, 
2014 WL 1516335, at *5 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 21, 2014) (“The record reflects that appellant 
did not seek to repent, and Pastor Samuel testified that appellant did not seek spiritual 
guidance, comfort, aid, or religious counseling. Instead, the discussions involved a family 
problem . . . .”). 
123 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Patterson, 572 A.2d 1258, 1265 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) 
(denying the privilege to statements not motivated by religious considerations or the search 
for forgiveness). 
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statute in the state.124 Defendant’s pastor previously provided the 
defendant and his wife marital and parental counseling. During a phone 
call, the defendant confessed to sexually abusing his step-daughter. The 
pastor conceded the defendant was seeking “comfort” but distinguished 
religious comfort from seeking sympathy.125 He opined that the 
conversation “could be manipulation” given the defendant “might have 
recognized that his statements were incriminating and that the defendant 
might have felt a ‘need to cover [his] tracks.’”126 According to the 
pastor, the defendant was looking for “someone who could bring some 
influence to bear on the situation” and “act as a middle man” between 
the defendant and his wife.127 Thus, the pastor concluded he could 
testify—reasoning the trial and appellate court accepted.128 
Between statutes dependent on clergy’s interpretations of religious 
disciplines and clergy’s own line drawing, the scope of protected 
communications is narrowing. This suggests a more discrete subset of 
protection may achieve the “full and satisfactory maintenance of the 
relationship” between cleric and communicant, thus further challenging 
the need for an absolute privilege. 
D. The Confidentiality Requirement 
Third, statutes uniformly privilege only confidential spiritual 
communications. Despite differences in black letter law, in application, 
clergy testimony frequently resolves the inquiry. This testimony shows 
clergy adopting restrictive definitions of confidentiality, thus 
challenging the traditional justification’s “empirical assumption” that 
sweeping “confidentiality is essential” to protect the clergy-
communicant relationship. 
Some courts focus on the communicant’s subjective expectations that 
the communication is confidential.129 This approach invites self-serving 
 
124 28 N.E.3d 1, 3 (Mass. App. Ct. 2015), rev. denied, 35 N.E.3d 721 (Mass. 2015). 
125 Id. at 4. 
126 Id. (alteration in original). 
127 Id. 
128 Id. But see State v. Gerhart, 129 S.W.3d 893, 899–900 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004) (denying 
privilege after minister characterizes conversation with communicant about her miscarriage 
as “simply a ‘Hi, how are you’ type conversation”). 
129 See, e.g., Gonzalez v. State, 21 S.W.3d 595, 598 (Tex. App. 2000), aff’d, 45 S.W.3d 
101 (discussing how “appellant’s subjective intent would have been relevant” to evaluating 
privilege); State v. Glenn, 62 P.3d 921, 926 n.5 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003) (subjective). 
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statements, particular by defendant communicants asserting the 
privilege.130 Aware of this, courts rely on clergy testimony as a check on 
a communicant’s claims of expected confidentiality. 
For example, in State v. Cardenas, a Minnesota Court of Appeals 
decision, the defendant was accused of sexual assault.131 He testified that 
he had a ten-year-long relationship with his pastor and sought him out to 
speak privately about the wrongdoing.132 With this testimony, the 
defendant’s subjective intent no longer controlled. Instead, the analysis 
converted to whether the cleric would confirm or refute the 
communicant’s intent.133 
Other courts adopt an objective standard, requiring that 
communicants have a reasonable expectation of confidentiality.134 This 
standard is intended to “separate[] idiosyncratic views from reasonable 
ones and disregards subjective thoughts that are not conveyed.”135 Under 
this approach, courts consider various factors, as set forth in Figure 7. 
Figure 7 
 
Proposed Federal Rule 506(a)(2) supports this interpretation. As the Advisory Committee 
Notes explain, since confidentiality is subjective to the communicant, confidentiality is 
presumed absent an intent to disclose. 3 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, 
Weinstein’s Federal Evidence, § 506App.01, Advisory Committee’s Note (Mark S. Brodin 
ed., 2d ed. 2016) (referencing proposed Rule 506, Communications to Clergy). 
130 This construction also poses a significant barrier in criminal cases where the defendant 
asserts his Fifth Amendment rights. See, e.g., State v. MacKinnon, 957 P.2d 23, 28–29 
(Mont. 1998) (“Because MacKinnon did not testify, there is no evidence as to his motives 
for engaging in the conversation nor any evidence as to his state of mind or his expectations 
of confidentiality.”). 
131 No. A13–0775, 2014 WL 1516335, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 21, 2014). 
132 Id. at *4. 
133 Id. at *4–5. 
134 See, e.g., State v. Mark R., 17 A.3d 1, 8 (Conn. 2011) (“In evaluating claims of 
privilege, we assess the confidentiality of a communication according to a standard of 
objective reasonableness.”); State v. J.G., 990 A.2d 1122, 1131 (N.J. 2010) (“We agree that 
the test should be an objective one.”); State v. List, 636 A.2d 1054, 1057 (N.J. Super. App. 
Div. 1993) (finding defendant’s letter to his pastor, “left for anyone to find and read” in 
unsealed file folder in a file cabinet in defendant’s abandoned house, was not made with “a 
reasonable expectation of confidentiality”); see also In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 
374, 377 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding privilege only protects persons “who reasonably expect that 
their words will be kept in confidence”). 
135 J.G., 990 A.2d at 1131. 
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These factors include whether the cleric and communicant met in 
private, the nature of their relationship, the type of information shared, 
and any promises of confidentiality.136 While clergy actively preserve 
confidentiality in some cases,137 their conduct and testimony more 
frequently generate new, more restrictive interpretations of 
confidentiality. 
For example, rather than actively helping “people handle their 
anxieties, guilts, fears, rages, doubts, and despairs,”138 some clergy are 
setting boundaries that limit such disclosures. This includes meeting 
with individuals in public places,139 conducting meetings with office 
doors left open,140 bringing third parties to meetings with potential 
communicants,141 or otherwise discouraging a communication.142 Often, 
 
136 See, e.g., Scott v. Hammock, 133 F.R.D. 610, 615 (D. Utah 1990) (considering who 
initiated the meeting and the location of the meeting); State v. MacKinnon, 957 P.2d 23, 28–
29 (Mont. 1998) (considering representations of confidentiality, who attended, lack of 
promised confidentiality, and the location of the meeting); J.G., 990 A.2d at 1133–34 
(considering the nature of the relationship between the cleric and the penitent, and the fact 
that the pastor and defendant met in private).  
137 Clergy are more protective of jail or hospital communications than courts. However, 
the trend is to deny the privilege to communications where, even for reasons outside the 
communicants’ control, an expectation of confidentiality is unrealistic. In such settings, the 
finding of privilege post 2000 drops to one out of eight cases. See, e.g., State v. Gardiner, 
898 P.2d 615, 619 (Idaho Ct. App. 1995) (finding discussion with hospital chaplain not 
confidential because hospital staff could enter the room where communications occurred). 
That said, some jurisdictions, like Texas, recognize these challenges and thus minimize this 
requirement in such settings, requiring only that the parties attempt to keep the 
communication as confidential as possible given these obstacles to true privacy. See, e.g., 
Nicholson v. Wittig, 832 S.W.2d 681, 685 (Tex. App. 1992) (“It is difficult to conceptualize 
a hospital setting that affords complete privacy to a chaplain and a communicant in 
circumstances where a family member is undergoing surgery. Common experience tells us 
that, more often than not, the chaplain will be assisting the family by affording company and 
comfort in the waiting room of a surgical suite, recovery room, or intensive care unit.”). 
138 Ronald Goldfarb, In Confidence: When to Protect Secrecy and When to Require 
Disclosure 124–25 (2009). 
139 See People v. Peterson, 47 N.E.3d 1005, 1053 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015), reh’g denied (Dec. 
16, 2015), appeal allowed, 48 N.E.3d 1095 (Ill. 2016); MacKinnon, 957 P.2d at 28. 
140 See, e.g., State v. Mark R., 17 A.3d 1, 6 (Conn. 2011) (open door); State v. Beloved, 
No. 14–1796, 2015 WL 8390222, at *2, *4 (Iowa Ct. App. 2015) (open door). 
141 See, e.g., State v. Pulley, 636 S.E.2d 231, 241 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006) (discussing how 
cleric intentionally brought other ministers and a church elder to meeting with 
communicant). 
142 See, e.g., Cartmell, 2014 WL 3056164, at *24 (discussing chaplain telling defendant 
that “he did not need to tell him what happened”). 
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clergy urge the communicant to go to the police and share the 
communication.143 In some instances, they go further, directly telling 
communicants early in conversations that they will not maintain a 
communicant’s confidences.144 Alternatively, some negate a potential 
privilege by repeating the communication to another person.145 
At trial, clergy’s conduct continues to limit when a communicant has 
a reasonable expectation of confidentiality. Clergy have testified despite 
previous promises to maintain the communicant’s confidentiality.146 As 
courts permit such testimony, it greatly narrows the concept of objective 
confidentiality. A communicant cannot rely on clerical representations 
of confidentiality to establish this required element.147 
Where clergy testimony is particularly pivotal, though, is in 
jurisdictions that consider religious doctrine to evaluate 
confidentiality.148 For these courts, a communication is objectively 
 
143 See, e.g., Bordman v. State, 56 S.W.3d 63, 66 (Tex. App. 2001) (discussing how Pastor 
and elders repeatedly urged defendant to confess). 
144 See, e.g., Cline v. Commonwealth, No. 2012-CA-001870-MR, 2014 WL 2159281, at 
*1 (Ky. Ct. App. May 23, 2014) (involving a cleric telling defendant to “stop right there. I’m 
a minister, and I’m a mother first, and I don’t want to hear anymore of this”); State v. 
Hancock, No. M2012-02307-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 7006969, at *6 (Tenn. Crim. App. 
Dec. 12, 2014), appeal denied (May 14, 2015) (noting clergy “made it clear to the defendant 
during these conversations that his paramount concern was locating the victim and that he 
intended to share with the police anything the defendant revealed regarding the victim’s 
disappearance”). 
145 See, e.g., State v. Gray, 891 So. 2d 1260, 1262 (La. 2005) (finding conversation not 
confidential because communicant failed to object to minister calling another pastor for 
assistance). 
146 See, e.g., People v. Edwards, 248 Cal. Rptr. 53, 54 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (telling 
communicant conversation would be confidential but then requiring disclosure to provide 
guidance); Hester v. Barnett, 723 S.W.2d 544, 550 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (“Notwithstanding 
the prior assurances [of confidentiality], the minister divulged to deacons of the church and 
members of the community the confidential communications from the family, and without 
their authority.”). 
147 Commonwealth v. Kebreau, 909 N.E.2d 1146, 1158–59 (Mass. 2009) (“At the 
beginning of the meeting, Pastor Ralph announced ‘rules’ for the meeting, including that any 
discussion at the meeting would remain confidential,” though at trial the pastor willingly 
testified.); Commonwealth v. Vital, 988 N.E.2d 866, 869–70 (Mass. App. Ct. 2013) (“Before 
disclosing the details of the incident, the defendant first asked the pastor whether he would 
have to testify against the defendant if a case were to ever proceed to trial. The pastor replied 
that he did not think that he would have to testify,” but the pastor proceeded to testify at 
trial.). 
148 See, e.g., Or. Rev. Stat. § 40.260(3) (2015) (preventing the examination of a clergy 
member “as to any confidential communication made to the member in the member’s 
professional character, if, under the discipline or tenets of the member’s church, 
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confidential once clergy identify some canonical basis to shield it.149 
This approach is similar to the “discipline-enjoined” restriction courts 
apply to the spiritual communications requirement and is equally 
problematic for confidentiality. Religious doctrine—particularly for the 
many Protestant religions that dominate the American religious 
landscape—is frequently inconclusive on these confidentiality queries. 
Thus, different clergy’s interpretations generate conflicting 
conclusions—thus challenging how essential confidentiality is. 
For example, consider two Michigan cases involving communications 
with Baptist ministers. Both involved allegations of criminal sexual 
misconduct.150 In both, the ministers learned of the abuse and spoke to 
the defendants in the private setting of their offices.151 In both, the 
defendants admitted their wrongdoing, and the clergy reported the abuse 
to the police.152 The courts splintered on whether the communications 
were privileged, though, based on conflicting representations by the 
clergy regarding confidentiality.153 In one, the cleric testified that under 
Baptist doctrine, the communication was confidential.154 In the other, the 
pastor stated, “under Baptist doctrine, the circumstances of his meeting 
 
denomination or organization, the member has an absolute duty to keep the communication 
confidential”). 
149 See, e.g., State v. Billman, No. 12 MO 3, 2013 WL 6859096, at *14 (Ohio Ct. App. 
Dec. 16, 2013) (relying on Pastor’s representations regarding canonical teaching to evaluate 
confidentiality); State v. Cox, 742 P.2d 694, 696 (Or. Ct. App. 1987) (“[Minister] also 
testified that, as a Mormon minister, he had a duty under the discipline of the church not to 
disclose confidential communications made to him.”). 
150 Compare People v. Richard, No. 315267, 2014 WL 2881081, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. 
June 24, 2014), with People v. Bragg, 824 N.W.2d 170, 174 (Mich. Ct. App. 2012). 
151 Compare Richard, 2014 WL 2881081, at *4 (discussing setting of conversation), with 
Bragg, 824 N.W.2d at 175 (discussing setting of conversation). 
152 Compare Richard, 2014 WL 2881081, at *1 (reporting to police), with Bragg, 824 
N.W.2d at 187 (reporting to police). 
153 Compare Richard, 2014 WL 2881081, at *6 (finding communications were not 
privileged because “under Baptist doctrine, the circumstances of [the pastor’s] meeting with 
defendant did not trigger . . . confidentiality”), with Bragg, 824 N.W.2d at 187 (finding 
communications were privileged because pastor “testified that under Baptist doctrine his 
communication with defendant would have been considered confidential”). 
154 Bragg, 824 N.W.2d at 176 (“The prosecutor inquired, ‘[U]nder the Baptist doctrine, 
under your church rules, would this communication that you had with him, and the nature 
how the communication came about, would that be . . . considered a confidential 
communication?’ [Pastor] Vaprezsan responded, ‘I’m sure it would.’” (alteration in 
original)). 
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with defendant did not trigger that confidentiality” because the 
conversation involved abuse.155 
As courts rely on clergy testimony to decide confidentiality, other 
fractures appear in the assumption that absolute confidentiality is 
essential to the clergy-communicant relationship. Notably, clergy are 
less likely to characterize communications regarding violent crimes as 
confidential.156 This directly contributes to a higher rate of privilege 
denials in such cases.157 
For example, the Alabama Court of Appeals in Tankersley v. State 
relied on clergy testimony to hold a communicant must affirmatively 
request confidentiality.158 There, the defendant called his pastor and 
discussed his desire to kill his ex-girlfriend. The pastor had spiritually 
counseled the defendant repeatedly in the past.159 At the subsequent 
murder trial, the pastor refuted the communicant’s claim of 
confidentiality. Rather than push for a protective definition of 
confidentiality, the pastor argued for carve-outs. She maintained the 
conversation was not confidential because “not one time did [defendant] 
say, I am talking to you as a pastor or this is a confidential 
conversation.”160 The pastor maintained she owed no obligation of 
confidence for threats of violence—a position not supported by the state 
privilege statute. Nonetheless, the trial court adopted the pastor’s 
restrictions, which the appellate court affirmed by finding a lack of 
privilege.161 
Thus, through both pretrial conduct and litigation testimony, clergy 
challenge the necessity—from a cleric’s perspective—of an absolute 
privilege. Though they continue to shield confidential, spiritual 
communications received in their professional capacity, clergy’s 
 
155 Richard, 2014 WL 2881081, at *1–2, 6. 
156 This is true even of communications made in otherwise confidential spiritual 
counseling. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. State, 45 S.W.3d 101, 102 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) 
(involving the disclosure communication between a Pastor and the appellant, whom the 
pastor was counseling because the appellant did not care about the pastor’s ability to keep 
secrets). 
157 Denial rate in violent crimes cases is 72.22%. See Bartholomew Clergy Data, supra 
note 54. 
158 724 So.2d 557, 561–62 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998). 
159 In fact, as the trial court noted, “The evidence indicated that [the defendant] had always 
called Pastor Henderson for spiritual guidance during times of distress.” Id. at 561. 
160 Id. at 560. 
161 Id. at 562, 566. 
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definition of qualifying conversations is narrower than existing statutory 
protection. These trends, however, only partially untangle the twisted 
history of privilege’s decline. Why courts rely on clergy testimony and 
why clergy testify contribute to the narrative. As the next Part explains, 
these answers challenge whether an absolute clergy privilege is even 
necessary—let alone realistic. 
III. UNDERSTANDING THE HOW AND WHY 
By their own words and conduct, clergy defy the traditional 
justification for absolute clergy privilege statutes. Rather than a 
relationship that should always be “sedulously fostered,”162 
jurisprudence shows clergy drawing ad hoc boundaries with 
communicants. Rather than treating confidentiality as “essential to the 
full and satisfactory maintenance” of those relationships,163 clergy 
willingly testify on a case-by-case basis. These cases only partially 
explain the privilege’s decline. This Part steps back to explore the 
factors that merged to give clergy significant say in privilege 
determinations. This Part then considers why clergy embrace a more 
qualified privilege. Combined, the following two Sections help explain 
the findings in Part II. 
A. How Clergy Testimony Became Pivotal 
Legislative and judicial dogmatic adherence to an absolute privilege 
has contributed to its decline. Sweeping statutory protection has pushed 
clergy to act as quasi-legislators, articulating boundaries that reflect 
canonical and judicial ends. Similarly, courts approach privilege 
determinations with increased judicial skepticism yet concurrently insist 
on maintaining an absolute privilege. This, too, foists responsibility to 
define the privilege on clergy, as discussed next. 
1. How Legislative Imprecision Opened the Door 
First, the inexactitude of state statutes triggers increased judicial 
reliance on clergy testimony for privilege determinations. The majority 
of state statutes adopt the same opaque language from the original New 
 
162 8 Wigmore, supra note 42, § 2285. 
163 Id. 
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York statute.164 Legislators have done little to decode some of the 
generic requirements from the initial statute. 
For example, take Iowa’s basic requirement that clergy be “the 
minister of the gospel.”165 This requirement necessarily turns on 
religious doctrine. As one court explains: 
What is a “minister of the gospel” within the meaning of [Iowa Code, 
Section 622.10]? The law as such sets up no standard or criterion. 
That question is left wholly to the recognition of the “denomination.” 
The word “minister,” which in its original sense meant a mere servant, 
has grown in many directions and into much dignity. Few English 
words have a more varied meaning. In the religious world it is often, if 
not generally, used as referring to a pastor of the church and a 
preacher of the gospel. This meaning, however, is not applicable to all 
Christian denominations. Some of them have no pastors and recognize 
no one as a minister in that sense, and yet all denominations recognize 
the spiritual authority of the church and provide a source 
of spiritual advice and discipline.166 
Similarly, defining “confessions” pushes courts to consider clergy 
testimony. Courts could require disclosure of the entirety of the 
communication and make their own evaluation about whether it is a 
confession. However, doing so conflicts with the notion of a testimonial 
 
164 Compare, e.g., N.Y. Rev. Stat. § 72, pt. III, ch. VII, tit. 3, art. 8 (1829) (since amended) 
(“No minister of the gospel, or priest of any denomination whatsoever, shall be allowed to 
disclose any confessions made to him in his professional character, in the course of 
discipline enjoined by the rules or practice of such denomination.”), with Ariz. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. § 13-4062 (2010) (“A clergyman or priest, without consent of the person making the 
confession, as to any confession made to the clergyman or priest in his professional character 
in the course of discipline enjoined by the church to which the clergyman or priest 
belongs.”), and Mont. Code Ann. § 26-1-804 (2015) (“A member of the clergy or priest may 
not, without the consent of the person making the confession, be examined as to any 
confession made to the individual in the individual’s professional character in the course of 
discipline enjoined by the church to which the individual belongs.”). 
165 See Iowa Code Ann. § 4608 (1913) (since amended). Iowa subsequently revised its 
privilege to cover communications with equally undefined “member of the clergy.” Iowa 
Code § 622.10 (2017). 
166 Reutkemeier v. Nolte, 161 N.W. 290, 292 (Iowa 1917). 
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privilege: parties would still have to disclose the confidence.167 Faced 
with this conundrum, courts instead adopt clergy’s labeling. 
Legislators’ efforts to expand clergy privilege statutes increase clergy 
influence. For example, as previously detailed in Subsection II.B.2, 
rather than first locking down the definition of confession, legislators in 
most states increased the categories of protected communications.168 
These new categories are equally imprecise. Take, for example, state 
statutes that protect communications offering “comfort.”169 Such a broad 
term necessitates further judicial interpretation: are the contents of 
prayer between clergy and communicants covered? What about 
blessings during times of crisis: are they “comfort?” Should it matter 
who initiates the conversation? 
In rare instances, state legislators have attempted to remedy these 
vague requirements. The results, however, only further complicate 
interpretation. For example, fifteen states impose the previously 
discussed “discipline-enjoined” requirement.170 “Discipline,” though, is 
hardly self-defining.171 As the Minnesota Supreme Court explains, “The 
 
167 Cf. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374, 388 (3d Cir. 1990) (finding that courts 
must consider delicate first amendment issues when conducting in camera hearings to 
determine whether communications are privileged). 
168 See, e.g., Ind. Code Ann. § 34-46-3-1(3) (LexisNexis 2008); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 233, 
§ 20A (2016); Minn. Stat. § 595.02 (2016); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:84A–23 (West 2011) 
(amended in 1994 to include “privileged communications” such as confessions, counseling, 
and other communications); Utah R. Evid. 503 n.(b) (amended to extend the privilege 
beyond “doctrinally required confessions”). 
169 See, e.g., Ala. Code § 12-21-166 (2012) (applying privilege to person communicating 
“(1) to make a confession, (2) to seek spiritual counsel or comfort, or (3) to enlist help or 
advice in connection with a marital problem”); Ga. Code Ann. § 24-5-502 (2013) (protecting 
“[e]very communication made by any person professing religious faith, seeking spiritual 
comfort, or seeking counseling”); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 233, § 20A (2016) (protecting “any 
communication made to him by any person in seeking religious or spiritual advice or 
comfort, or as to his advice”); Minn. Stat. § 595.02 (2016) (protecting “religious or spiritual 
advice, aid, or comfort or advice”). 
170 See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-2233 (2016); Cal. Evid. Code § 1032 (Deering 2004); 
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-90-107 (2017); D.C. Code § 14-309 (2001); Fla. Stat. § 90.505 (2016); 
Idaho Code § 9-203 (2010); 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/8-803 (2016); Mich. Comp. Laws 
Serv. § 600.2156 (2004); Mont. Code Ann. § 26-1-804 (2015); Or. Rev. Stat. 
§ 40.260 (2015); 9 R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-17-23 (2012); Tenn. Code Ann. § 24-1-206 (2000); 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-1-137 (LexisNexis 2012); Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-400 (2015); Wash. 
Rev. Code § 5.60.060 (2016); W. Va. Code Ann. § 57-3-9 (LexisNexis 2012); Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 1-12-101 (2017). 
171 See, e.g., Cassidy, supra note 13, at 1640–44 (discussing judicial splits in interpreting 
the “discipline enjoined” requirement). 
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word ‘discipline’ has various meanings. It may relate to education. It 
involves training and culture. It may mean training in moral rectitude, 
and it was probably in part so used here. It may refer to rules and duties. 
The word has no technical legal meaning . . . .” 172 Or, as Professor Mary 
Mitchell more colorfully explains, “Such sloppy drafting leaves 
unanswered the question of the privilege’s application to most 
confidential communications to most clergy! Few churches require their 
members to make private confessions to clergy; probably none require 
their members to seek counseling.”173 While courts adopt conflicting 
interpretations to this “discipline-enjoined” requirement,174 clergy keep 
chipping away against legislative efforts to broaden protection. In doing 
so, clergy are not acting with malice or indifference to the 
communicants. Rather, the cases highlight clergy discomfort with an 
absolute privilege. 
Imprecise terms, alone, are not necessarily problematic. As Judge 
Ruggero Aldisert explains: “Case-by-case development allows 
experimentation because each rule is re-evaluated in subsequent cases to 
determine whether it produces a fair result. If it operates unfairly, it can 
be modified.”175 Rather, the point here is that legislators have failed to 
revisit the privilege in response to clergy’s case-by-case approach.176 
This leaves courts to balance potentially wide-reaching statutory 
 
172 In re Swenson, 237 N.W. 589, 590 (Minn. 1931). 
173 Mitchell, supra note 49, at 754. 
174 In the face of this ambiguity, some courts ignore the “discipline-enjoined” requirement, 
others wade into murky religious doctrine, and still others impose it to construe both the 
“communication” and “confidentiality” requirements. Compare, e.g., Nussbaumer v. State, 
882 So. 2d 1067, 1076 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (merging “discipline-enjoined” and 
professional capacity requirements), and Swenson, 237 N.W. at 591 (same), with, e.g., State 
v. Martin, 975 P.2d 1020, 1025 (Wash. 1999) (defining the state’s “discipline enjoined” 
requirement as clergy’s doctrinal obligations to hear a confidence), and People v. Johnson, 
75 Cal. Rptr. 605, 607 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969) (same), and Scott v. Hammock, 870 P.2d 947, 
955–56 (Utah 1994) (considering the “discipline of [the clergy’s] church” to evaluate 
whether a nonpenitential communication was privileged), and Ball v. State, 419 N.E.2d 137, 
139–40 (Ind. 1981) (permitting testimony of Baptist minister regarding parishioner’s 
admission to murders because constitution of church did not require pastoral confession, or 
confidential pastor-parishioner discussion with respect to crime), and People v. Richard, No. 
315267, 2014 WL 2881081, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. June 24, 2014) (considering religious 
practices for both confidentiality and communication requirements), and State v. Billman, 
No. 12 MO 3, 2013 WL 6859096, at *13–14 (Oh. Ct. App. Dec. 16, 2013) (same). 
175 Ruggero J. Aldisert, The Honorable Ralph Cappy: Distinguished Keeper of the King’s 
Bench Tradition, 47 Duq. L. Rev. 481, 482 (2009). 
176 See supra Part II. 
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protection against their obligation to interpret privileges narrowly. This 
impossible tightrope act leaves courts relying on clergy testimony to 
reach more restrained privilege determinations. 
2. How the Judiciary Began Deferring to Clergy 
The lack of legislative guidance is but one source of judicial reliance 
on clergy in privilege determinations. A change in how ardently courts 
interrogate the privilege also creates room for greater clergy influence. 
For over a century, most courts only loosely examined clergy 
privilege assertions. A decision may address a single requirement or 
generically recite the requirements with little analysis.177 However, the 
growth of clergy privilege assertions in the late 1980s brought a 
corresponding greater scrutiny of the privilege’s requirements. Rather 
 
177 For example, in Milburn v. Haworth, the Supreme Court of Colorado subjected the 
defendant’s clergy privilege assertion to minimal scrutiny, simply stating:  
The statements made by the defendant to his fellow churchmen, including the 
minister, were not made to the minister in his professional character in the course of 
discipline enjoined by the particular church. . . . The statements were made in the 
same manner that they would have been made to any other four gentlemen whom the 
defendant might call together.  
108 P. 155, 156 (Colo. 1910). The court did not address any of the criteria for the 
requirement in depth nor attempt to detail how it reached its conclusion. This hands-off, 
deferential approach continues today in Washington and Oregon, where courts only loosely 
question a clergy privilege challenge. For example, in most other states, courts trend towards 
refusing the privilege in cases of child abuse. See, e.g., State v. Latham, No. E2006-02262-
CCA-R3CD, 2008 WL 748381, at *20 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 20, 2008) (finding 
communication by defendant accused of aggravated child abuse not privileged because the 
chaplain was merely a bystander); Maldonado v. State, 59 S.W.3d 251, 253 (Tex. App. 
2001) (finding communication by defendant accused of indecency with a child to a bishop 
not privileged because the bishop was not acting in his professional character as a spiritual 
advisor). In Oregon and Washington, though, the trend is the opposite. See, e.g., State v. 
Cox, 742 P.2d 694, 696–97 (Or. Ct. App. 1987) (finding defendant’s confession of sexual 
intercourse with his step-daughter privileged based on cleric’s promise of confidentiality, 
despite defendant’s testimony that “he did not want [the clergy] to withhold any testimony”); 
“Jane Doe” v. Corp. of President of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 90 P.3d 
1147, 1151–52 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004) (accepting church’s statement that all disciplinary 
investigations are confidential, thus finding defendant’s communications regarding 
allegations of abuse to eighteen church council members privileged despite lack of finding 
the participants were clergy); State v. Glenn, 62 P.3d 921, 925–27 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003) 
(finding communication by defendant accused of child molestation and rape to his church 
elder privileged despite the church’s lack of a “doctrine of confession” and the clergy’s 
statement that he did not consider defendant’s communication a confession). 
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than accepting wholesale assertions of privilege, courts began 
scrutinizing them more closely, evaluating each requirement at length.178 
This increased scrutiny, particularly of the confidentiality 
requirement, is not isolated. The judiciary has already narrowed privacy 
rights in both intellectual property179 and Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence.180 This same trend is now evident in the clergy privilege; 
though in this context, this skepticism has other roots as well. Though it 
would be overreaching to draw a causal connection, the timing of both 
the 1980s televangelist scandals181 and the more recent clergy abuse 
scandals suggests it would be naïve to ignore their impact. As illustrated 
in Figure 8, a wave of clergy privilege denials followed the televangelist 
scandals and a corresponding drop in Americans’ confidence in 
organized religion.182 A second wave of denials followed in 2002, when 
societal confidence began a free fall from which it has yet to recover.183 
 
178 See, e.g., People v. Campobello, 810 N.E.2d 307, 321–22 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) 
(analyzing multiple statutory requirements before denying privilege); Richard, 2014 WL 
2881081, at *3–6 (analyzing each statutory requirement). This is not universal though. See, 
e.g., Cline v. Commonwealth, No. 2012-CA-001870-MR, 2014 WL 2159281, at *2 (Ky. Ct. 
App. May 23, 2014) (analyzing only communication requirement); Lundman v. McKown, 
530 N.W.2d 807, 829 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (same). 
179 See, e.g., Neil Richards, Intellectual Privacy: Rethinking Civil Liberties in the Digital 
Age 82–83 (2015) (discussing Supreme Court jurisprudence narrowing privacy rights). 
180 See, e.g., Schuyler B. Sorosky, United States v. Forrester: An Unwarranted Narrowing 
of the Fourth Amendment, 41 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1121, 1137 (2008). See generally Albert W. 
Alschuler, Interpersonal Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, 4 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 1, 16–17 
(1983) (detailing the Supreme Court’s narrowing of Fourth Amendment standing). 
181 Three then-prominent televangelists had scandals in the late 1980s: Jimmy Baker, Pat 
Robinson, and Jimmy Swaggart. First, in 1987, Baker admitted to having an affair and 
paying his secretary, Jessica Hahn, to conceal a sexual encounter. The next year, he was 
indicted for fleecing his congregation of $150 million. He was convicted in 1989. 
Meanwhile, in 1987, Pat Robertson admitted to lying about his marriage to conceal the 
premarital conception of a child. Then, Jimmy Swaggart, another televangelist whose 
ministry was broadcasted on more than 250 television stations, was implicated in two 
scandals with prostitutes after Swaggart exposed a fellow minister of adultery. Swaggart’s 
transgressions culminated with a famous speech in February 1988, during which he 
confessed. Ann Rowe Seaman, Swaggart: The Unauthorized Biography of an American 
Evangelist 341 (1999). 
182 Jeffrey M. Jones, Confidence in U.S. Institutions Still Below Historical Norms, Gallup 
Org. (June 15, 2015), http://www.gallup.com/poll/183593/confidence-institutions-below-
historical-norms.aspx (noting a 13% decline in confidence in churches and religious 
institutions in 2015 compared to historical averages). 
183 Mark Chaves, American Religion: Contemporary Trends 79 (2013) (analogizing the 
drop comparable “in magnitude to the sudden drop in confidence in banks and financial 
institutions caused by the 2008 global financial crisis”). 
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Notably, 2002 marked the publication of the Boston Globe report of the 
clergy abuse scandals—reporting that began a “firestorm of negative 
publicity” for religious institutions.184 
Figure 8 
 
As confidence dropped, judicial interrogation of privilege assertions 
deepened. The response to the clergy abuse by some religious 
institutions only fueled judicial skepticism. Rather than mirroring the 
general trend of clergy narrowly interpreting the privilege, in the church 
sex abuse cases, clergy uniformly pushed for blanket protection.185 Many 
churches raised clergy privilege objections to shield communications by 
alleged clergy perpetrators to their superiors186 and fellow priests.187 
These cases reflect a self-interested interpretation of the privilege, where 
 
184 Id. 
185 See, e.g., Roman Catholic Archbishop v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. Rptr. 3d 209, 216, 231 
(Ct. App. 2005), as modified on denial of reh’g (Aug. 16, 2005) (discussing how appellant 
Archbishop improperly asserted blanket privilege assertions for twenty-two document 
requests); People v. Campobello, 810 N.E.2d 307, 311–12 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (reflecting 
monsignor’s refusal to produce any of the requested documents in clergy abuse case). 
186 See, e.g., Ex parte Zoghby, 958 So. 2d 314, 325 (Ala. 2006) (evaluating clergy 
privilege assertion over defendant priest’s communications to his Archbishop); Campobello, 
810 N.E.2d at 311 (deciding whether clergy privilege applied to priest’s records maintained 
by his monsignor); Hutchison v. Luddy, 606 A.2d 905, 908 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (evaluating 
defendant priest’s communications in church’s “secret archive”). 
187 Kos v. State, 15 S.W.3d 633, 638–40 (Tex. App. 2000) (addressing priest’s assertion of 
privilege regarding communications to a fellow priest). 
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clergy claimed virtually every document between a cleric and superior 
was privileged.188 
While this absolutist approach appears across denominations in 
church sex abuse cases,189 the Roman Catholic church, most notably, has 
urged broader privilege coverage, even when a priest is the victim in a 
case. For example, in Commonwealth v. Stewart, the defendant was 
charged with murdering a priest.190 As part of his defense, he asserted 
self-defense and sought production records regarding the priest’s alleged 
alcohol and drug use; any allegations of misconduct or disciplinary 
action; and all personal records, correspondence, diaries, or similar 
documents maintained by the Reverend.191 The Church refused to 
produce any of these materials in whole or part, asserting clergy 
privilege. The trial court rejected such a sweeping interpretation, noting 
“it is clear that the [clergy privilege] statute does not provide blanket 
protection for all documents in the hands of the Diocese simply because 
of the Diocese’s status as a religious organization.”192 
It may not be surprising that skepticism towards religious institutions 
impacts judicial willingness to shield religious communications. With 
 
188 For example, in Hutchison v. Luddy, the plaintiff, an alleged victim of sexual assault by 
Father Luddy, sought discovery of three categories of documents, all of which were related 
to the Church’s investigation of wrongdoing: 
(1) documents in the Canon 489 file which in any way pertain to Father Francis 
Luddy, for the years 1974 through the present. (Request for Production No. 27). 
(2) documents in the Canon 489 file which pertain to any alleged and/or actual reports 
of sexual involvement with minor male children by priests in the Altoona–Johnstown 
Diocese, for the years 1974 through the present. (Request for Production No. 28). 
(3) documents in the Canon 489 file relating to a specifically named priest. (First 
Supplemental Request for Production No. 9). 
606 A.2d at 906. The defendants categorically refused, providing blanket assertions of 
privilege, which the Superior Court of Pennsylvania subsequently denied for failure to 
establish how the privilege applied to each document. Id. 
189 State v. Dotseth, 766 N.W.2d 648, 648 (Iowa Ct. App. 2009) (asserting privilege in 
Church of One abuse case); Vermilye v. State, 754 S.W.2d 82, 86 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987) 
(claiming privilege in Episcopalian priest abuse scandal). This self-protecting interpretation 
applies even when the cleric is the victim, not the defendant. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 
Stewart, 690 A.2d 195, 196–97, 200–01 (Pa. 1997) (noting in case involving murder of 
priest wherein defendant sought victim’s personnel records where it is unclear whether the 
requested information is within the privilege, an in camera review of the documents is 
appropriate). 
190 647 A.2d 597, 598 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994). 
191 Id. at 599. 
192 Id. at 601. 
COPYRIGHT © 2017 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION 
1056 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 103:1015 
 
clergy pushing for blanket privileges in child abuse cases, courts 
responded with across-the-board increased scrutiny of clergy privilege 
assertions193—even in non-abuse cases.194 What is a bit surprising, 
though, is the judicial decision to embrace clergy testimony, rather than 
shy away from it.195 This is particularly surprising given confidence in 
religious leaders has declined at a faster rate than for leaders of any 
other institutions.196 Given the problems with the statutory language 
previously detailed,197 courts have had little choice but to depend on the 
clergy to shape the privilege. Judicial reliance on court-appointed 
experts or other neutral sources is problematic. Such an approach 
requires courts to undertake independent fact finding as courts weigh 
competing religious testimony to interpret canonical law. As one court 
explains the problem, “civil judges attempting to apply such a test would 
first have to identify and define the specific religious tenets of a 
particular religion, which may not always be readily apparent.”198 
Further, identifying neutral experts is difficult, given how prevalent 
 
193 For example, in clergy abuse cases, courts increasingly rely on in camera reviews to 
evaluate such assertions. See, e.g., Hethcote v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diosean Corp., No. 
X04CV054003450S, 2007 WL 1121361, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 3, 2007) (applying in 
camera review); People v. Campobello, 810 N.E.2d 307, 321–22 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (same). 
194 A comparison of two Massachusetts appeals, just over two decades apart, shows this 
trend towards increased scrutiny of clergy privilege assertions. Compare Commonwealth v. 
Nutter, 28 N.E.3d 1, 4, review denied, 35 N.E.3d 721 (Mass. App. Ct. 2015) (affirming the 
denial of clergy privilege in a child abuse case after exploring the relationship between the 
clergy and communicant and the content of the communication at issue), with Ryan v. Ryan, 
642 N.E.2d 1028, 1034 (Mass. 1994) (affirming granting of privilege in annulment case by 
assuming the communication “may well have literally involved ‘seeking religious or 
spiritual advice or comfort’”). 
195 The argument here is not that courts suddenly began relying on clergy testimony. 
Rather, from inception, clergy privilege cases often turned on clergy testimony. See, e.g., 
People v. Gates, 13 Wend. 311, 323 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1835) (“An objection was made to the 
proof of certain admissions made by the defendant, on the ground that they were confessions 
made to a clergyman. The answer to this objection is found in the testimony of Dr. Ludlow, 
that he did not consider the communication made to him in his professional character, or as a 
clergyman.”). Increased judicial scrutiny generated greater reliance on clergy testimony. 
196 Chaves, supra note 183, at 79. 
197 See supra Subsection III.A.1. 
198 State v. J.G., 990 A.2d 1122, 1132 (N.J. 2010). 
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different canonical interpretations are.199 To minimize this questionable 
judicial religious entanglement,200 courts turn to the clergy witness. 
This reliance perpetuates continued reliance on clergy testimony by 
stunting the development of common law interpretations of the 
privilege’s requirements. By relying on clergy testimony, trial courts are 
making factual, not legal findings. These fact findings are subject to 
abuse of discretion review.201 This limits appellate review, where 
reversal is limited to “arbitrary, irrational, capricious, whimsical, 
fanciful, or unreasonable” decisions.202 Unlike the de novo review 
afforded to questions of law, this extreme deference limits appellate 
 
199 See supra Section II.D. 
200 Judicial interpretation of religious doctrine walks a fine constitutional line. Under the 
Establishment Clause, government activity (including conduct by the judiciary) must not 
foster excessive entanglement with religion. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 
(1971) (setting forth a three-part test for Establishment Clause claims and including 
excessive entanglement as the third prong). By turning to religious doctrine to identify 
religiously necessary or confidential communications, courts must delve into questions of 
doctrine and faith—the very intertwining prohibited under the Establishment Clause. See 
Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 
450 (1969) (noting civil courts may not “determine matters at the very core of religion—the 
interpretation of particular church doctrines and the importance of those doctrines to the 
religion”); Jane E. Mayes, Striking Down the Clergyman-Communicant Privilege Statutes: 
Let Free Exercise of Religion Govern, 62 Ind. L.J. 397, 408 (1987) (discussing how 
“religious confidentiality statute[s] launch[] state investigations into religious doctrines and 
provide[] for government surveillance of religious institutions, [which] leaves the state and 
religion closely intertwined, a result forbidden by the establishment clause”); cf. Klagsbrun 
v. Va’ad Harabonim of Greater Monsey, 53 F. Supp. 2d 732, 739–42 (D.N.J. 1999) 
(dismissing defamation claim because “questions of religious doctrine permeate” complaint 
and resolving claim would “delve dangerously into questions of doctrine and faith”), aff’d 
o.b., 263 F.3d 158 (3d Cir. 2001); Abdelhak v. Jewish Press, 985 A.2d 197, 200 (N.J. App. 
Div. 2009) (dismissing defamation claim that would invite excessive entanglement contrary 
to First Amendment, because jury could not evaluate claim “without developing a keen 
understanding of religious doctrine, and without applying such religious doctrine to the facts 
presented”). 
201 See, e.g., State v. Archibeque, 221 P.3d 1045, 1048 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009) (where the 
court applies a three-pronged factual determination to decide the application of privilege); 
People v. Trammell, 345 P.3d 945, 947–48 (Colo. App. 2014), ¶10, cert. denied, No. 
14SC335, 2015 WL 1205596 (Colo. Mar. 16, 2015) (“We will not disturb a trial court’s 
evidentiary rulings absent a showing of an abuse of discretion.”); accord Nicholson v. 
Wittig, 832 S.W.2d 681, 684 (Tex. App. 1992) (reviewing trial court’s finding of privilege 
using an abuse of discretion standard); State v. Glenn, 62 P.3d 921, 924 (Wash. Ct. App. 
2003) (reviewing trial court’s finding of privilege using an abuse of discretion standard). 
202 Peter Nicolas, De Novo Review in Deferential Robes?: A Deconstruction of the 
Standard of Review of Evidentiary Errors in the Federal System, 54 Syracuse L. Rev. 531, 
533 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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courts from articulating clear, consistent guidelines to evaluate privilege 
determinations.203 It also sacrifices the more cerebral and academic 
understanding of testimony that usually accompanies appellate 
decisions.204 
Judicial reliance on clergy testimony only increases as courts issue 
unpublished or otherwise unciteable decision designations.205 In 
California alone, more than one-third of clergy privilege cases are 
unpublished.206 These unpublished opinions hinder the growth of a 
“coherent, consistent and intelligible body of case law.”207 When one 
court interprets a particular clergy privilege requirement in an 
 
203  See Robert L. Hess II, Judges Cooperating with Scientists: A Proposal for More 
Effective Limits on the Federal Trial Judge’s Inherent Power to Appoint Technical Advisors, 
54 Vand. L. Rev. 547, 586 (2001) (noting “the efficacy of mere abuse of discretion review is 
doubtful”). This problem with deferential evidentiary standards of abuse is not limited to the 
clergy privilege. See, e.g., Christine P. Bartholomew, Death by Daubert: The Continued 
Attack on Private Antitrust, 35 Cardozo L. Rev. 2147, 2179–80 (2014) (discussing how a 
deferential abuse of discretion review hinders evaluation of economic expert testimony); 
Amy B. Hargis & Joe R. Patranella, Rethinking Review: The Increasing Need for a Practical 
Standard of Review on Daubert Issues in Place of Joiner, 52 S. Tex. L. Rev. 409, 417 (2011) 
(arguing that trial courts evaluate economic expert testimony subjectively). 
204  See L. Steven Emmert, Appellate Law, 45 U. Rich. L. Rev. 169, 180 (2010); Jonah J. 
Horwitz, Social Insecurity: A Modest Proposal for Remedying Federal District Court 
Inconsistency in Social Security Cases, 34 Pace L. Rev. 30, 56 (2014) (discussing the 
appellate court’s “capacity for attracting cerebral jurists”). 
205 See, e.g., State v. Gil, No. 2 CA-CR 2013-0508, 2014 WL 4725805, at *1 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. Sept. 23, 2014); Candice S. v. Superior Court, No. H032683, 2008 WL 3274099, at *4 
(Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 11, 2008); Hethcote v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diosean Corp., No. 
X04CV054003450S, 2007 WL 1121361, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 3, 2007); People v. 
Pearson, No. 305957, 2012 WL 2919543, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. July 17, 2012); State v. 
Schauer, No. A13-0500, 2014 WL 6608790, at *7 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 24, 2014); EMC, 
LLC v. Cooper, No. A-0948-10T4, 2012 WL 5381688, at *10 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
Nov. 5, 2012); Jackson v. Futrell, No. M1999-01046-COA-R3-CV, 2000 WL 279900, at *3 
(Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 16, 2000); State v. Huffman, No. 50937–3–1, 120 Wash. App. 1038, 
(2004). 
206 See Bartholomew Clergy Data, supra note 54; Jennifer K. Anderson, Comment, The 
Minnesota Court of Appeals: A Court Without Precedent?, 19 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 743, 
760–63 (1993) (discussing how a lack of published opinions makes it difficult to know to 
evaluate the current state of the law); see also People v. Rodriguez, No. G046114, 2012 WL 
5992130 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 29, 2012); People v. Hoffman, No. F061127, 2012 WL 
2583404 (Cal. Ct. App. July 5, 2012), as modified on denial of reh’g (July 30, 2012); 
Candice S., 2008 WL 3274099; People v. Camacho, No. E037402, 2006 WL 3445491 (Cal. 
Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2006). 
207 Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1179 (9th Cir. 2001). 
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unpublished opinion, another court cannot rely on that decision.208 
Instead, the court reanalyzes the requirement anew,209 with judges again 
turning to clergy to make fact-specific findings.210 
Thus, increased judicial scrutiny of privilege assertions has solicited 
more clergy testimony. This testimony, in turn, undermines the 
traditional justification for an absolute privilege. That said, more clergy 
testimony did not have to diminish the privilege’s application: clergy 
could have maintained the same absolutist approach adopted in the 
church abuse scandal cases. However, they have not. The next Section 
explores why. 
B. Why Clergy Resist the Privilege 
As mentioned in Part I, when posed with a hypothetical scenario, 
clergy responses indicate genuine intentions to maintain confidences.211 
As Part II details, however, clergy repeatedly cast testimony as outside 
the privilege.212 Thus, the question of why clergy testify explores the gap 
between clergy’s desires and actual practices. This exploration 
 
208 See, e.g., Shenoa L. Payne, The Ethical Conundrums of Unpublished Opinions, 44 
Willamette L. Rev. 723, 750 (2008); Erica S. Weisgerber, Unpublished Opinions: A 
Convenient Means to an Unconstitutional End, 97 Geo. L.J. 621, 647 (2009) (noting that 
“[courts] may subsequently depart from the rules or holdings in those prior unpublished 
opinions”). 
209 See David R. Cleveland, Overturning the Last Stone: The Final Step in Returning 
Precedential Status to All Opinions, 10 J. App. Prac. & Process 61, 169 (2009) (describing a 
survey in which judges attributed unsettled jurisprudence, in part, to unpublished opinions); 
Sarah E. Ricks, The Perils of Unpublished Non-Precedential Federal Appellate Opinions: A 
Case Study of the Substantive Due Process State-Created Danger Doctrine in One Circuit, 81 
Wash. L. Rev. 217, 228 (2006) (discussing how nonprecedential dispositions hinder decision 
making). 
210 Federal clergy privilege decisions are limited but similarly encourage greater reliance 
on clergy testimony. The most exhaustive circuit court treatment of the privilege is In re 
Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374, 377–78 (3d Cir. 1990). There, a Lutheran minister 
jointly counseled the defendant, his fiancée, and his parents. The defendant, Shaw, was 
suspected of racially motivated arson of his neighbor’s home. Shaw occasionally attended 
church, while his parents were active members. At trial, the pastor maintained that all 
attendants of the counseling sessions were essential for effective counseling and expected 
such communications be kept strictly confidential. The Third Circuit remanded the trial 
court’s denial of the privilege. The Court directed the lower courts to inquire into the nature 
of the communicants’ relationship as well as the pastoral counseling practices of the relevant 
synod of the Lutheran church. Id. at 387–88. Clergy testimony is central to such inquiries. 
211 See supra Part I and accompanying notes. 
212 See supra Part II and accompanying notes. 
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necessarily traverses the terrain of supposition: individual clerics may 
have unknowable reasons for testifying in a given case. 
Given this caveat, this Section offers a potential explanation of 
clergy’s conduct in privilege cases. In the absence of religious guidance 
and standardized professional codes of conduct, clergy—consciously or 
otherwise—weigh the importance of testifying.213 Under the traditional 
justification, the clergy privilege is absolute, in part because of a 
presumption that “[t]he injury that would inure to the relation by the 
disclosure of the communication [is] greater than the benefit thereby 
gained for the correct disposal of litigation.”214 Clergy privilege statutes 
treat confidentiality as an isolated duty. Once confidential information is 
shared, privilege statutes assume a cloak of silence drapes the 
communication, not to be lifted by the courts.215 Hence, underlying the 
privilege is an unstated assumption that for clergy, too, confidentiality is 
paramount. 
This premise ignores clergy’s competing duties. As one cleric 
explains, clergy serve multiple constituents: 
[Clergy] are citizens under the laws of their own society; they also 
have responsibilities to individual members of their families and to 
their neighbors. As people of broad moral outlook, many clergy feel 
an accountability to the wider human community. They are 
accountable to their denominational leadership and denominational 
policy. They also have an answerability to God as they understand 
God. Within their congregations, clergy must assume the difficult and 
sometimes contradictory roles of administrator, preacher, counselor, 
 
213 Cf. William W. Rankin, Confidentiality and Clergy: Churches, Ethics, and the Law 10 
(1990) (“The clergy person assuredly does not assume the same stance in every situation; 
rather the clergy person chooses a particular stance, based on his or her reading of that given 
situation. He or she interprets the situation in order to respond appropriately to the need or 
concern, and upon this interpretation of the clergy person plays through the situation as it 
begins to unfold.”). 
214 8 Wigmore, supra note 42, §§ 2285, 2396; see also supra Part I and accompanying 
notes (detailing this and other justifications for the clergy privilege).  
215 While some jurisdictions provide carve-outs for child abuse reporting, all other spiritual 
communications remain protected by the letter of the law. See, e.g., N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§ 516:35 (2007); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8-53.2 (2015); Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 2505 (2010); 9 R.I. 
Gen. Laws § 9-17-23 (2012); Tex. R. Evid. 505; W. Va. Code Ann. § 57-3-9 (LexisNexis 
2012). 
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teacher, worship leader, officiant at specialized ritual functions, friend, 
and professional colleague, among others.216 
Confidentiality is but one of clergy’s many responsibilities.217 Clergy 
also shoulder secular and nonsecular obligations to protect their 
congregations,218 aid the search for justice,219 and help victims.220 
These competing duties can outweigh a cleric’s hypothetical interest 
in confidentiality. In State v. Hancock,221 for example, a pastor testified 
about communications with the defendant in a murder case.222 As part of 
ongoing pastoral counseling, the defendant told the pastor details about 
his wife’s recent disappearance and the defendant’s role in that 
 
216 Rankin, supra note 213, at 8–9; see also Moskowitz & DeBoer, supra note 10, at 21 
(“To the religious community, [clergy] are administrators and advisers, preachers and public 
figures, counselors and teachers. To the local community, they are fellow citizens and 
consumers, friends and neighbors, parents and spouses. Functioning in these widely differing 
roles, clergy interact with parishioners and nonparishioners alike in a whole host of religious 
and non-religious communications.”); Video: Faith & Community: The Public Role of 
Clergy (Polis Ctr. at Ind. Univ. 2003) (“[T]he public roles of clergy can include leader of 
worship at a public event, caregiving during time of crisis, advocate for social issues, 
interpreter of tradition for a wider audience, education for faith and ministry, public care, 
and pastoral care and counseling.”). 
217 See, e.g., Mark Herman, The Liability of Clergy for the Acts of Their Congregants, 98 
Geo. L.J. 153, 167 (2009) (detailing clergy’s various duties). 
218 See, e.g., Eileen Schmitz, Staying in Bounds: Straight Talk on Boundaries for Effective 
Ministry 175 (2010) (“It is the responsibility of the pastor, as shepherd of the congregation, 
to insure the health and safety of her sheep.”). 
219 See, e.g., Azizah al-Hibri, The Muslim Perspective on the Clergy-Penitent Privilege, 29 
Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1723, 1730 (1996) (discussing how Muslims are obligated to “advance 
justice in society and to serve the societal maslaha”). 
220 See, e.g., Marie M. Fortune, Confidentiality and Mandatory Reporting: A Clergy 
Dilemma?, Faith Tr. Inst. 1, 3–4 (2014), http://www.faithtrustinstitute.org/resources/articles/
Confidentiality-and-Mandatory-Reporting2014.pdf (“The other ethical principle which 
applies here is that of justice-making in response to harm done by one person to another. 
Christian scripture here is very specific: ‘Be on your guard! If another disciple sins, you 
must rebuke the offender, and if there is repentance, you must forgive.’ (Luke 17.3 NRSV) 
The one who sins and who harms another must be confronted so that he might seek 
repentance. Both Hebrew and Christian scriptures are clear that repentance has to do with 
change: ‘ . . . get yourselves a new heart and a new spirit! . . . Turn, then, and live.’ (Ezekiel 
18.31-32 NRSV). The Greek word used for repentance is metanoia, ‘to have another 
mind.’”(alteration in original)). 
221 No. M2012-02307-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 7006969, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 12, 
2014), appeal denied (May 14, 2015). 
222 Id. at *2. 
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disappearance.223 In deciding to testify, the pastor focused on his 
responsibility to help the victim, stating, “I felt that was my paramount 
duty, not just as a citizen, but even as a pastor was to find the location 
[of the victim].”224 Adopting this prioritizing of duties, the court denied 
the privilege.225 
Particularly in criminal cases, a cleric’s duty of confidentiality 
competes with a concurrent duty to aid the search of justice.226 Shielding 
a confession reduces the likelihood the defendant will face the 
consequences of his wrongdoing. As one religious scholar states: 
“Confidentiality was never intended to be merely keeping of secrets. 
Nor was it ever intended to protect offenders from the consequences of 
their behaviors. Clergy who interpret confidentiality in this way are 
enabling the offender to continue offending.”227 Cases reflect this 
concern, as People v. Johnson illustrates.228 The case involved a 
confession of murder to Muslim brothers.229 The appellate court of New 
York recognized that such communications could be privileged.230 
Nonetheless, at trial, the brothers testified, overlooking potential 
confidentiality issues based on “fear that defendant might be dangerous, 
and their desire to get him out of the mosque.”231 
Clergy traverse a fine line in prioritizing their varied duties. A cleric 
who maintains confidences in cases of violent crimes and sexual abuse 
risks harm to the very relationship the privilege is intended to foster.232 
 
223 Id. at *5 (discussing how this counseling focused on defendant’s relationship “[w]ith 
the Lord and with his wife”). 
224 Id. 
225 Id. at *6. 
226 Cf. Gerald J. Margolis, The Psychology of Keeping Secrets, 1 Int’l Rev. Psycho-
Analysis 291, 291 (1974) (“The more dangerous a secret, the greater the desire to give it 
away, and at the same time the greater the fears of its revelation.”). 
227 Marie M. Fortune, Violence in the Family 208 (1991). 
228 115 A.D.2d 973, 973 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985). 
229 Id. 
230 Id. 
231 Id. Some clergy similarly prioritize protecting the congregation in child abuse cases. 
See, e.g., Gutierrez v. State, No. 01-09-00939-CR, 2010 WL 4484350, at *1 (Tex. App. Nov. 
10, 2010) (breaching defendant’s confidences out of concern for other children in the 
church). 
232 See Alberta Mazat, Abuse: Confidentiality, Reporting, and the Pastor’s Role, Ministry 
(Nov. 1995), https://www.ministrymagazine.org/archive/1995/11/abuse-confidentiality-
reporting-and-the-pastors-role [https://perma.cc/PFH6-6NCL] (“When confidentiality 
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This perspective clarifies clergy’s willingness to cast confessions as 
“confrontations” or “investigations”233 or even serve as informants.234 
Doing so moves such communications outside the duty of 
confidentiality and into the realm of the competing duty to protect.235 In 
contrast, hiding behind the privilege risks the congregation viewing the 
cleric as part of the wrongdoing.236 Yet, sharing such confidences may 
similarly fuel discontent. Speaking out may draw the ire of congregants 
who may not recognize the competing duties implicated.237 Such 
conflicting pressures may push clergy to make case-specific decisions 
regarding whether to testify.238 
 
becomes the means of keeping in bondage even for one more day a person undergoing 
harmful and illegal exploitation, it is no longer serving its purpose.”).  
233 See, e.g., State v. McCurdy, 823 N.W.2d 418, 418 (Iowa Ct. App. 2012) 
(investigation); Gutierrez, 2010 WL 4484350, at *1 (confrontation). 
234 State v. Jackson, No. M2000-00763-CCA-R3-CD, 2001 WL 812254, at *7 (Tenn. 
Crim. App. July 18, 2001). 
235 Cf. Rankin, supra note 213, at 10 (“Sometimes the pastor ‘reframes’ a situation based 
on his or her interpretation of what is actually needed.”). 
236 See, e.g., Rebecca Edmiston-Lange, Boundaries and Confidentiality, in The Safe 
Congregation Handbook: Nurturing Healthy Boundaries in Our Faith Communities 28, 28 
(Patricia Hoertdoerfer & Fredric Muir eds., 2005) (discussing how “destructive [the] cloak of 
secrecy can be”); Marci A. Hamilton, Child Sex Abuse in Institutional Settings: What Is 
Next, 89 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 421, 436 (2012) (discussing how shielding communications 
allows a “perpetrator [to] find the next victim in the very same institution and . . . assume 
that the cloak of anonymity will cover his or her misdeeds”). 
237 For a discussion of these competing tensions in the context of clergy communications 
and elder abuse, see Moskowitz & DeBoer, supra note 10, at 5 (“Clergy who report elder 
abuse face risks including disclosure and hostility, the accusation of causing ‘unfair charges,’ 
loss of trust and credibility, and breach of religious discipline. Those who do not report also 
face risks such as criminal penalties and civil damages; indeed, the religious institution itself 
could be liable through vicarious liability.”). 
238 Some religious scholarship actively encourages clergy to engage in this moral 
weighing. See, e.g., Ronald K. Bullis & Cynthia S. Mazur, Legal Issues and Religious 
Counseling 111–14 (1993) (providing guidelines for religious counselors, broken down 
between considerations for “the religious counselor [that] wants to break a confidence” and 
“the religious counselor [who] wants to remain silent”); D. Elizabeth Audette, 
Confidentiality in the Church: What the Pastor Knows and Tells, Christian Century (Jan. 28, 
1998), http://www.religion-online.org/showarticle.asp?title=317 (arguing confidentiality 
turns on how the cleric “perceives the ministerial role at a given time in a given encounter” 
so it is up to the pastor to “determine the limits of his or her confidentiality”); Rebecca 
Edmiston-Lange, Boundaries and Confidentiality (Unitarian Universalist), 
http://www.uua.org/safe/handbook/leadership/165736.shtml [https://perma.cc/SZR5-949N] 
(“[I]f a rigorous moral justification to override a confidence exists, they should not feel they 
have betrayed another by divulging the information.”). 
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Clergy have bemoaned the need for greater guidance in reconciling 
confidentiality and competing ethical duties.239 Other professionals, such 
as attorneys and psychotherapists, have the benefit of nuanced canons of 
professional conduct to guide them.240 Clergy lack similar professional 
canons of ethics241 or governing ethics committees.242 Similarly, 
educational training on how to deal with crises is often inadequate,243 
despite the reality that clergy are frequently “first responders.”244 
 
239 See, e.g., Audette, supra note 55; Rankin, supra note 213, at 130–31. 
240 Unlike other professionals, clergy are unlikely to face potential malpractice actions for 
breaching confidentiality. Currently, no state recognizes a cause of action for clergy 
malpractice. Only Ohio permits a potential negligence claim for violating the clergy 
privilege. Alexander v. Culp, 705 N.E.2d 378, 382 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) (permitting 
negligence claim against clergy for alleged disclosure of confidential information that 
parishioner had affair). But see Strock v. Pressnell, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1239 (Ohio 1988) 
(rejecting tort of clergy malpractice on the facts of the case). Rather than permitting a cause 
of action, Tennessee courts can impose a fine for breach of spiritual communications. See, 
e.g., Tenn. Code Ann. § 24-1-206 (2000) (stating violation of the clergy privilege statutes is 
a Class C misdemeanor). Some may view malpractice liability as a way to clarify disclosure 
requirements. However, it is unclear that courts would necessarily use such claims for such 
an undertaking. See, e.g., Alexander, 705 N.E.2d at 381 (permitting negligence claim 
without delineating between protected and nonprotected communications). 
241 Rankin, supra note 213, at 131; see also Lightman v. Flaum, 761 N.E.2d 1027, 1032 
(N.Y. 2001) (explaining clergy “are not subject to State-dictated educational prerequisites 
and, significantly, no comprehensive statutory scheme regulates the clergy-congregant 
spiritual counseling relationship”); Richard M. Gula, Ethics in Pastoral Ministry 3 (1996) 
(discussing limited ethical foundations for clergy duty of confidentiality); Cassidy, supra 
note 5, at 1684 (“[T]here are no universal standards of ethics that govern clergy conduct.”). 
242 See, e.g., Am. Psychological Ass’n, Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of 
Conduct (1992) (psychotherapists); Am. Bar Ass’n, Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 
Rule 1.6 (2015) (attorneys); cf. Rankin, supra note 213, at 131 (“Lawyers, physicians, and 
hospitals, after all have professional standards review bodies and ethics committees of one 
sort or another. Why not have the same for clergy and the church? The absence of clear 
ethical codes argues for some ongoing resource of this sort.”). 
243 Bullis & Mazur, supra note 238, at 34 (“A nonrandom sample of theological schools 
indicates that few courses are offered to prepare religious counselors for the variety of 
clinical situations that may lead to lawsuits. Thus, clergy are increasingly faced with legal 
issues that previous generations of clergy have not had to address.”); Wanda Lott Collins & 
Sharon E. Moore, Theological and Practice Issues Regarding Domestic Violence: How Can 
the Black Church Help Victims, 33 Soc. Work & Christianity 252, 258 (2006) (“[M]ost 
pastors’ seminary training does not include crisis counseling that focuses on dangerous, 
threatening, or violent behavior.”); Nancy Nason-Clark, Making the Sacred Safe: Woman 
Abuse and Communities of Faith, 61 Soc. Religion 349, 359–65 (2000). 
244 U.S. Conf. of Catholic Bishops, When I Call for Help: A Pastoral Response to 
Domestic Violence Against Women (2002), http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/
marriage-and-family/marriage/domestic-violence/when-i-call-for-help.cfm.  
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This absence leaves clergy to search out guidance wherever 
available—even if that means the annals of the Internet. Take, for 
example, a recent blog post by a pastor. After he gave a sermon at an 
out-of-state summer camp, a man approached the Protestant cleric, 
confessing to the murder of a man who raped his girlfriend. Faced with 
this information, the cleric sought guidance online because he is of “a 
Protestant, non-demoniational [sic] church. We do not consideral [sic] 
confession a sacrament, as a Catholic would, so there are no particular 
clerical obligations to uphold. Our polity [sic] is complete congregation 
autonomy: there is no supervising bishop or denomination headquarters 
to consult.”245 Instead, the minister was forced to rely on online 
responses for guidance—and the responses highlight how individualized 
decision making is for clergy.246 While some encouraged the pastor to 
divulge the information, others adamantly contended he was obliged to 
keep the confidence. 
Some individual denominations have responded to this request for 
guidance. Unfortunately, these responses have trended towards the 
generic.247 For example, the Christian Church (Disciples of Christ) 
adopted a proposed code of ethics that merely instructs that ministers: 
 
245 See Ask MetaFilter, How Does a Protestant Minister Handle a Confession of Murder? 
(Oct. 20, 2006 4:29 PM), http://ask.metafilter.com/48795/How-does-a-Protestant-minister-
handle-a-confession-of-murder [https://perma.cc/VQ2G-8CGL]. 
246 Id. (detailing the various, inconsistent responses on whether minister is morally 
obligated to report a murder to the police). 
247 See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Evangelicals, Code of Ethics for Congregations and Their 
Leadership Teams (Sept. 2015), http://nae.net/code-of-ethics-for-congregations/ [https://
perma.cc/7ZTH-FC64] (discussing the need for transparency and dealing “fairly and openly 
with causes of scandal” without providing confidentiality guidelines); Univ. Presbyterian 
Church, Code of Conduct for Clergy, Church Staff and Volunteers (Feb. 26, 2008), 
www.upc.org/download_file/view/473/ [https://perma.cc/TF8U-U2UC] (instructing church 
personnel to “maintain confidentiality” without further guidance). Others are more helpful, 
though, and clarify a cleric’s obligation to protect confidentiality, guiding clerics to discuss 
issues of confidentiality at the outset of a communication and forgoing confidentiality when 
the client discusses intent to harm himself or others. Archdiocese of St. Louis, Code of 
Ethical Conduct for Clergy, Employees and Volunteers Working with Minors § 3 
http://archstl.org/sep/page/policies-information-and-resources-code-ethical-conduct-1 
[https://perma.cc/TA2E-DLU8] (last visited Aug. 16, 2017). 
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“protect[] confidences; covenanting to only tell those who need to know, 
what they need to know, when they need to know it.”248 
Canonical tenets are equally imprecise. Judaism and most Protestant 
religions have no explicit canonical or doctrinal obligation to maintain 
confidences.249 At the other extreme is Catholicism, where 
confidentiality absolutism is at its most extreme, with canonical law 
stating, “it is absolutely wrong for a confessor in any way to betray the 
penitent, for any reason whatsoever.”250 For religions between these 
extremes, any institutional treatment only minimally assists clergy in 
evaluating their competing duties.251 For example, the United Methodist 
Book of Discipline states: “Ministers . . . are charged to maintain all 
confidences inviolate, including confessional confidences, 
except . . . where mandatory reporting is required . . . .”252 
Thus, religious institutions share responsibility for the decline in the 
privilege.253 Nonspecific mandates to maintain confidentiality ignore the 
ongoing internal debate clergy experience when called as witnesses. 
Without leadership, clergy chart their own paths between silence and 
disclosure.254 
 
248 Christian Church (Disciples of Christ), My Ministerial Code of Ethics (Oct. 10, 2011), 
http://disciples.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Ministerial_Code_of_Ethics-english.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6EB5-A5M5].  
249 See Goldfarb, supra note 138, at 138; William Harold Tiemann, The Right to Silence: 
Privileged Communication and the Pastor 22 (1964). 
250 Catholic Code of Canon Law c.983, § 1 (2003). 
251 See, e.g., David Neff, Why the NAE Issued a Clergy Code of Ethics, Christianity Today (June 
13, 2012), http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2012/juneweb-only/nae-clergy-ethics-code.
html (“Denominations have produced a few things, but most haven’t. The few existing 
statements tend to be truncated in scope or overly legalistic and rule specific.”). 
252 Marvin W. Cropsey, The Book of Discipline of the United Methodist Church ¶ 341.5 
(2012). 
253 Some denominations have promulgated codes of ethics for pastoral counseling. These 
too, though, are less than exacting. See, e.g., Ethics Statement of the Christian Association 
for Psychological Studies (Apr. 7, 2005), http://caps.net/about-us/statement-of-ethical-
guidelines [https://perma.cc/KAR6-KYG2] (instructing CAPS members to “maintain the 
confidentiality of information that is provided to them in a professional setting, consistent 
with the limits of applicable laws and regulations”). 
254 Sissela Bok’s work on secrecy and confidentiality supports this understanding of clergy 
behavior. Sissela Bok, The Limits of Confidentiality, The Hastings Center Report 24, 31 
(Feb. 1983). (“The premises supporting confidentiality are strong, but they cannot support 
practices of secrecy—whether by individual clients, institutions, or professionals—that 
undermine and contradict the very respect for persons and for human bonds that 
confidentiality was meant to protect.”). 
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Admittedly, no single answer explains clergy’s willingness to testify. 
Legislators continue to expand clergy privilege statutes without 
clarifying the triggering requirements for the privilege. Courts fill these 
gaps by turning to clergy testimony about religious doctrine. In 
providing this testimony, though, clergy must balance competing duties 
with insufficient legal or secular guidance on when to speak and when to 
stay silent. Consequently, the decline of the privilege—and clergy’s role 
in that decline—is the result of this mutable blend. 
IV. QUALIFYING THE CLERGY PRIVILEGE 
Through their interpretation of statutory requirements, clergy have 
created an opening to reevaluate the necessity of an absolute clergy 
privilege. The general thrust of the traditional justification for the 
privilege is still apt: the clergy privilege exists to protect religious 
relationships between communicants and clergy. Yet, the conclusion that 
this relationship must always be sedulously fostered or that 
confidentiality is essential to that relationship is unsupported conjecture. 
Given this reality, as informed by the empirical analysis undertaken 
earlier in this Article, this Part argues in favor of codifying a qualified 
clergy privilege.255 
As discussed in Part I, privileges are grouped into two distinct 
categories: absolute—meaning the privilege does or does not apply—or 
qualified—meaning courts decide the privilege through a case-specific, 
need-based balancing test.256 Such binary categories ignore that 
sometimes a party other than the court engages in a case-specific 
 
255 As an initial clarification, the proffered solution is not for the clergy to own the 
privilege outright. Consequently, this proposal stands in contrast to Professor Colombo’s 
proposal for a specific clergy testimonial privilege. See Colombo, supra note 13, at 248–51. 
Shifting ownership invites clergy to assert the privilege even when the communicant is 
willing to testify—thus potentially increasing the privilege’s application at an unacceptable 
cost to justice. See, e.g., Jack B. Weinstein, Some Difficulties in Devising Rules for 
Determining Truth in Judicial Trials, 66 Colum. L. Rev. 223, 228–29 (1966) (truth-
finding capability of rules of evidence is fundamental concern of rules’ drafters). 
256 See, e.g., Edward J. Imwinkelried, A Psychological Critique of the Assumptions 
Underlying the Law of Evidentiary Privileges: Insights from the Literature on Self-
Disclosure, 38 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 707, 726 (2004) (discussing how a rejection of Wigmorean 
absolutist assumptions behind privileges “would probably lead to the reclassification of most 
privileges as qualified or conditional”). 
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balancing test. Currently, clergy undertake this balancing, making moral 
decisions that shape and narrow the “real” scope of the privilege. 
Adopting a qualified privilege shifts responsibility back to the 
judiciary. Rather than wholesale acceptance of clergy’s labeling, courts 
would engage in case-specific weighing. Fortunately, this Article’s 
research provides a foundation for this shift. Courts and legislators can 
integrate the lessons learned from existing jurisprudence. Clergy’s 
testimony and conduct have generated multi-factor tests to balance the 
privilege against the need for evidence in a given case. For example, 
courts could consider the type of case at issue. Cases involving violent 
crimes, potential future danger to others, or abuse could require a greater 
showing that the communication needs shielding on religious grounds. 
Similarly, to decide whether a cleric acted in his professional capacity, a 
court could consider the location of the meeting, the duration of the 
relationship between the communicant and clergy, and a preexisting 
spiritual counseling relationship to decide an asserted privilege.257 
At its core, this proposed solution pushes legal realism over legal 
formalism.258 A qualified privilege would remedy illusory statutory 
protection. As the case law establishes, existing clergy privilege statutes 
promise a degree of protection that—if applied literally—would shield 
far more testimony than actually occurs. A qualified privilege moves 
clergy privilege statutes towards protection aligned with prevailing 
interpretations. 
As this Part explains, the argument here is not solely to unify law and 
application. For many statutes, application is detached from law, despite 
the fairness259 and transparency260 gains afforded by unity.261 Rather, a 
 
257 See supra Figure 7 (setting out confidentiality factors). 
258 Robert A. Shiner, Legal Realism, in The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy 425 
(Robert Audi ed., 1995).  
259 See, e.g., Stuart F. Schaffer, Informing the Jury of the Legal Effect of Special Verdict 
Answers in Comparative Negligence Actions, 1981 Duke L.J. 824, 847 (1981) (discussing 
how gaps in law and application can “erod[e] public confidence in the fairness of the 
legal system”). 
260 See Michael M. O’Hear, Sentencing the Green-Collar Offender: Punishment, 
Culpability, and Environmental Crime, 95 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 133, 239 (2004) (“A 
system characterized by a gap between law and practice is a system that lacks 
transparency.”). 
261 As Roscoe Pound long ago noted, “the law upon the statute books will be far from 
representing what takes place actually.” Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 
Am. L. Rev. 12, 34 (1910); see also Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence—The 
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qualified approach unifies the clergy privilege with liberal evidentiary 
rules. Further, this solution best straddles the need for relevant evidence 
in the truth-finding endeavor with the concurrent need to respect 
religious relationships. 
A. Aligning Policy and the Clergy Privilege 
Congress adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence to liberalize the 
admissibility of evidence.262 The rules begin with a controlling missive: 
evidence is admissible unless there is some special reason to exclude it. 
From broadening the definition of competent witnesses to expanding 
evidence an expert can rely on,263 evidentiary restrictions have lessened. 
State evidentiary rules unsurprisingly reflect this trend; the majority of 
states refashioned their laws to model the federal approach.264 Further, 
particularly for privileges, these rules are to be dynamic. The Supreme 
Court has reiterated the need for “evolutionary development” of 
testimony privileges—urging reconsideration of privileges when 
“experience suggest[s] the need for change.”265 
Yet, as detailed in Part II, the clergy privilege is an anomaly against 
this backdrop.266 Qualifying the clergy privilege is a step closer to 
 
Next Step, 30 Colum. L. Rev. 431, 439 n.9 (1930) (differentiating “paper” rules from “real” 
ones). Generally, such disconnect occurs with restrictive laws, meaning those that prohibit 
certain behavior—such as speed limits or littering laws—where the potential compliance 
gains of the law justify the disconnect. See Michael D. Gilbert, Insincere Rules, 101 Va. L. 
Rev. 2185, 2185–88 (2015) (discussing the disconnect between law and application and the 
rationale for the disconnect). The clergy privilege presents an inverse scenario: rather than a 
limit on activity, the privilege promises a scope of protection that would not exist but for the 
privilege, and in fact does not actually exist in application. 
262 Robert P. Burns, Notes on the Future of Evidence Law, 74 Temp. L. Rev. 69, 79 (2001) 
(“[A]t least since the passage of the Federal Rules of Evidence, there has been a strong drift 
towards admissibility in the law of evidence . . . .”). 
263 See, e.g., Jeffrey Cole, The Federal Hearsay Rule: You Can’t Believe Everything You 
Hear, Litigation, Spring 2008, at 51, 56 (detailing these expansions).  
264 See, e.g., Richard D. Friedman, Crawford, Davis, and Way Beyond, 15 J. L. & Pol’y 
553, 553 (2007) (discussing how state evidentiary law has liberalized because most states 
adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence, which themselves embodied a more generous view 
towards admissibility); Mark Hansen, Believe It or Not, 79 A.B.A. J. 64, 67 (1993) 
(discussing how state and federal courts alike have liberalized evidentiary standards). 
265 Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47–48 (1980). 
266 See Imwinkelreid, supra note 256, at 726 (“In the past few decades, there has been an 
incipient trend to treat privileges as qualified rather than absolute.”). 
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unifying evidentiary rules towards liberalizing admissibility. It also 
finally integrates judicial experience with the privilege. 
This approach would also limit the shielding of often highly probative 
testimony without unnecessarily compromising the key policy 
considerations underlying the privilege. In this way, such a revision 
protects judicial truth finding by ensuring the clergy privilege does not 
expand beyond its policy aims. Taken in turn, a qualified privilege limits 
the privilege while respecting the policy considerations underlying the 
traditional and autonomy rationales detailed in Part I. 
First, a qualified privilege still promotes the traditional justification of 
protecting religious relationships. Protecting all spiritual 
communications can compromise—rather than advance—spiritual 
relationships more generally. A qualified approach more expansively 
protects “religious relationships.” A qualified privilege allows courts to 
assess whether, in a given case, the privilege promotes or compromises 
the “prestigious place in society” that religion holds. To the extent the 
privilege exists because of a desire to promote spiritual relationships, a 
qualified privilege best tempers the potential harm from too broad a 
privilege. It provides a mechanism to weigh a cleric’s competing duties 
to other members of his congregation and thus to protect not just the 
spiritual relationship between the particular communicant and clergy but 
the relationships with other potential communicants as well. 
Similarly, a qualified privilege considers both parties to the religious 
relationship. Absolute statutes currently on the book disproportionately 
emphasize the communicant. These statutes, if applied literally, protect 
at cost to a cleric who might want to testify. Arguably, even a 
comforting pat on the back from a cleric during a conversation could 
convert it into a privileged discussion. Rather than focusing solely on 
communicants’ desires to confide, a qualified privilege also takes into 
account a cleric’s desire to disclose. Courts can weigh these views, 
along with other factors relevant to the case, in making a privilege 
determination. 
A qualified privilege also advances the traditional justification by 
encouraging spiritual communications. Communicants decide to talk 
based on more than legal considerations. As Professor Leo observed, 
after hearing Miranda warnings, detained individuals still talk roughly 
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seventy-five percent of the time.267 Even more on point, though, is the 
absence of any chilling effect under the current arrangement, whereby 
clergy rather than courts are engaging in this weighing. In fact, 
communicants already confide to clergy who explicitly state their 
intention to share the information. Behavioral science research shows 
motivation for self-disclosure is too multifaceted and individualized to 
causally link to any single variable.268 The privilege does not need to be 
absolute.269 
A qualified approach could also incentivize religious institutions to 
articulate concrete tenets regarding spiritual communications for clerical 
and judicial consideration. Tailored rather than generic tenets have the 
potential to advance confidence in religion by conceding not all 
communications are confidential. This, in turn, encourages religious 
relationships and advances the traditional justification far more than 
clergy-by-clergy decision making.270 
Second, a qualified privilege does not compromise autonomy. 
Communicants can still rely on religious consultations and beliefs when 
making decisions. As cases evidence, even with the rate of successful 
privilege assertions dropping, clergy remain a primary source of advice 
and guidance on everything from legal guidance to marital problems.271 
A qualified privilege does not compromise this consulting function, seen 
as essential to an autonomy-based rationale. A qualified privilege may 
even enhance communicant autonomy.272 Currently, a communicant 
could rely on statutory language and incorrectly assume a 
 
267 See Richard A. Leo, The Impact of Miranda Revisited, 86 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 
621, 653 (1996). 
268 See Imwinkelried, supra note 256, at 713–14 (debunking the link between law and self-
disclosure using behavioral science research).  
269 This requisite involvement of religious institutions is realistic, since, as detailed in 
Section III.B, canonical confidentiality requirements are evolving.  
270 Thus, this solution is tripartite. State legislatures would need to enact statutory language 
to recognize the existing qualified nature of the privilege. The judiciary then would adopt 
relevant factors. Finally, religious institutions would articulate guidelines that courts could 
consider about a particular religion. 
271 See, e.g., People v. Police, 651 P.2d 430, 430 (Colo. App. 1982) (legal advice); People 
v. Peterson, 47 N.E.3d 1005, 1052 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015), reh’g denied (Dec. 16, 2015), appeal 
allowed, 48 N.E.3d 1095 (Ill. 2016) (marital counseling). 
272 See Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom 155 (1986) (discussing how the exercise of 
autonomy intelligently as a rational actor requires informed choice); accord Joseph Raz, 
Liberalism, Autonomy, and the Politics of Neutral Concern, in 7 Midwest Studies in 
Philosophy: Social and Political Philosophy 89, 112 (Peter A. French et al. eds., 1982). 
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communication is privileged. A qualified privilege would help 
communicants understand the potential legal consequences of seeking 
religious guidance. These are not new consequences. Rather, the current 
absolute appearance of the privilege masks these risks. In contrast, a 
codified qualified privilege is more transparent about potential judicial 
disclosures.273 
A qualified privilege also brings more balance to autonomy concerns. 
An absolute privilege spotlights a communicant’s right to autonomy. 
This narrow focus compromises clergy’s freedom of choice in 
responding to the divulgences. In revealing a confidence, the speaker has 
divested a portion of that secret to another.274 He foregoes some of his 
autonomy by involving the listener. Consequently, in sharing a secret, 
the communicant has triggered consideration of the cleric’s autonomy, 
and with it concordant consideration of the cleric’s duties and 
obligations.275 A qualified privilege provides an opening currently 
missing for judicial consideration of these duties. 
Third, a qualified privilege also sufficiently responds to the 
democratic rationale. Clergy’s testimony and the declining rate of 
successful privilege assertions minimize this rationale. A court rarely 
faces the “offensive” scenario of compelling clergy to testify.276 
However, the current dynamic creates an opposing offensive scenario: 
an absolute privilege can force a cleric to maintain a confidence he does 
not want to keep. A qualified privilege moderates both problematic 
scenarios. A clergy’s view is relevant but not an outcome-determinative 
factor in deciding the privilege. Hence, a qualified privilege reflects 
legal realities while still minimizing “the unpleasant prospect of 
imprisoning clergy for contempt of court.”277 
 
273 Further, a qualified privilege also remedies inconsistency between various autonomy-
based privileges. See, e.g., Beerworth, supra note 94, at 100 (discussing the existing 
disconnect between the attorney-client privilege and the clergy privilege). 
274 Cf. Sissela Bok, Secrets: On the Ethics of Concealment and Revelation 24 (1982) 
(“[T]he claim to own secrets about oneself is often far-fetched.”). 
275 See Charles Foster, Choosing Life, Choosing Death x (2009) (discussing how 
individual autonomy must give ground to competing ethical duties). These duties drove 
Jeremy Bentham, a rabid opponent of privileges, to conclude that the clergy’s claim to the 
privilege exceeds the communicant’s. Bentham, supra note 42, at 588. 
276 In rare situations where a clergy member is in contempt, courts usually impose little to 
no penalty for not testifying. See, e.g., People v. Campobello, 810 N.E.2d 307, 322 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 2004) (discussing issuance of contempt order only to allow appeal, not to punish). 
277 Imwinkelried, New Wigmore, supra note 4, § 5.4.4.a., at 420 n.138. 
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Combined, this proposed solution returns responsibility to the 
legislature, the judiciary, and religious institutions and off the shoulders 
of clergy. State legislatures would need to recognize the existing 
qualified nature of the privilege and enact statutory language to codify 
this reality.278 The judiciary would then finally develop factors to 
consider for such a balancing test. Finally, religious institutions would 
articulate guidelines for courts to consider—but not necessarily mirror—
as part of that multifactor analysis. This approach, thus, respects the 
rationale for the privilege while remediating the trifold abdication that 
shifted decision-making responsibility onto clergy. 
B. A Qualified Privilege Is the Most Tailored Solution 
Any proposed solution triggers questions about whether one solution 
is preferable to another. Admittedly, this Article’s solution is no 
different. A qualified privilege precludes ex ante guarantees of 
protection. Currently, though, such protection is equally uncertain. 
Though it is not without its downsides, a qualified privilege is less 
problematic than other alternative revisions. 
The more skeptical may urge eviscerating the privilege altogether. If 
the trend in evidentiary rules is liberalized admissibility, surely 
removing the clergy privilege altogether best achieves that goal. 
However, such an argument goes too far. Further, scholars have made 
strong First Amendment arguments, which are beyond the scope of this 
argument, for some clergy privilege.279 Eliminating the clergy privilege 
altogether would also mean that policy justifications, such as autonomy, 
matter more for conversations with psychotherapists or attorneys than 
with clergy. Such an extreme approach unnecessarily challenges public 
 
278 Once state legislators take this step, it paves a path for federal courts to follow in suit. 
See Peter Nicolas, “They Say He’s Gay”: The Admissibility of Evidence of Sexual 
Orientation, 37 Ga. L. Rev. 793, 869 (2003) (“One factor to which the federal courts look in 
deciding whether to recognize a new privilege, or to alter the parameters of an existing one, 
are the trends in the states.”). 
279 Courts have yet to hold the First Amendment requires a clergy privilege. Nonetheless, 
scholars have convincingly argued this point. See, e.g., Bailey, supra note 1, at 514. 
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support for the privilege,280 ignoring how deeply etched the clergy 
privilege is in the American psyche.281 
The better question, perhaps, is why not articulate a series of 
exceptions or presumptions. Codified exceptions could provide a greater 
degree of predictability than a qualified privilege. For example, potential 
exceptions could include removing threats or communications about 
abuse from the categories of protected communications. Alternatively, 
why not identify different standards for different cause of action, like the 
spousal privileges do? 
Such incremental proposals forgo the lessons from clergy privilege 
jurisprudence. Consequently, they inaccurately identify cases where 
clergy willingly testify. For example, courts and clergy alike are reticent 
to privilege clergy communications in criminal cases.282 This might 
suggest excluding criminal cases.283 Some privileges already only apply 
either in civil or criminal cases, but not both.284 In fact, some courts have 
inched towards this approach by recognizing a cleric’s duty to warn and 
 
280 See id. at 504 (“The fact that all fifty states and the District of Columbia have enacted 
statutes ensuring the place of the clergy-penitent privilege demonstrates public approval of 
the privilege.”). 
281 Cassidy, supra note 5, at 1630 (“The clergy-penitent privilege is deeply engrained in 
American culture.”). Movies, television shows, and books all reinforce society’s 
expectations for some form of the clergy privilege. See, e.g., I Confess (Warner Brothers 
1953); Law and Order: The Collar (Season 12, Episode 11). Popular culture does not dictate 
the parameters of justice, but it does influence how radically to alter law. More 
fundamentally, though, the privilege remains a vital part of the tenuous contract between 
church and state. Thus, a lesser course than elimination is necessary. 
282 See, e.g., Tankersley v. State, 724 So.2d 557, 562 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998); 
Commonwealth. v. Nutter, 28 N.E.3d 1, 4–5 (Mass. App. Ct. 2015), review denied, 35 
N.E.3d 721.  
283 Accord Goldfarb, supra note 138, at 143 (discussing how refusal to testify “may be 
appropriate, even socially acceptable, in civil cases . . . but it should not be tolerated when 
ongoing criminal actions are involved or gross miscarriages of justice are perpetrated as a 
result”).  
284 See, e.g., Michael H. Graham, 1 Handbook of Federal Evidence § 505.1 at 715 (5th ed. 
2001) (explaining how in federal court, the martial testimony privilege applies only to 
criminal cases); accord Thomas A. Mauet & Warren D. Wolfson, Trial Evidence § 8.10 at 
259 (1997); 2 Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence § 206 at 426 
(2d ed. 1994); 3 Weinstein & Berger, supra note 129, § 505.04 at 505–07. But see Katherine 
O. Eldred, “Every Spouse’s Evidence”: Availability of the Adverse Spousal Testimonial 
Privilege in Federal Civil Trials, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1319, 1346 (2002) (arguing it is unclear 
whether the privilege applies differently in criminal and civil cases). 
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to protect his congregation as reasons to waive the confidentiality.285 
However, simply carving out criminal cases creates an arbitrary 
boundary. Such cases involve undoubtedly privileged communications, 
such as sacramental Catholic confessions. At the same time, this option 
excludes other instances where clergy decline to testify—such as 
divorce proceedings. Thus, such an approach is both over and under 
inclusive.286 
Piecemeal exceptions also invite half-measures rather than 
comprehensive change.287 Efforts to expand abuse reporting illustrate the 
problem. Clergy are mandatory reporters in twenty-two states.288 In 
seventeen additional states, any person who suspects child abuse or 
neglect is required to report it.289 While some states deny the clergy 
 
285 See, e.g., Cassidy, supra note 5, at 1673 (arguing clergy bear the same duty to warn as 
psychotherapists and attorneys). But see Terry Wuester Milne, “Bless Me Father, for I Am 
About to Sin . . .”: Should Clergy Counselors Have a Duty to Protect Third Parties?, 22 
Tulsa L.J. 139, 147–65 (1986) (arguing against clergy obligation to protect third parties). 
286 Privileging only confessions is also under inclusion. It risks protecting only Catholics, 
without similar protection for religions where a penitent confesses directly to her god. 
Hence, such a carve-out invites the potential for unnecessary religious entanglement by the 
judiciary and related concerns regarding unnecessarily hampering religious liberty. 
287 Similarly, affording clergy their own privilege or, at a minimum, shared ability to 
waive the privilege is unworkable. This would make the privilege an aberration, as the 
communicant owns almost all other privileges. See supra Part I. Further, allowing the clergy 
to decide the privilege cases would lead to a two-tier privilege. Clergy may afford more 
restrictive interpretations when they are witnesses rather than parties. Adopting a qualified 
privilege minimizes such issues. 
288 Ala. Code § 26-14-3 (2016); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3620 (2010); Cal. Penal Code 
§ 11165.7 (Deering 2008); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 19-3-304 (2017); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 17a-101 
(2015); 325 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/4 (2016); La. Child. Code Ann. art. 603 (2014); Me. Stat. 
tit. 22, § 4011-A (2016); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 119, § 51A (2016); Mich. Comp. Laws Serv. 
§ 722.623 (LexisNexis 2013 & Supp. 2017); Minn. Stat. § 626.556 (2016); Miss. Code Ann. 
§ 43-21-353 (2015 & Supp. 2016); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 210.115 (2016); Mont. Code Ann. § 41-
3-201 (2015); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 169-C:29 (2014); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32A-4-3 (2013); 
N.D. Cent. Code § 50-25.1-03 (2007 & Supp. 2015); 23 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. 
§ 6311 (West 2017); S.C. Code Ann. § 63-7-310 (2010 & Supp. 2016); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 33, 
§ 4913 (2014 & Supp. 2016); W. Va. Code § 49-2-803 (LexisNexis 2015); Wis. Stat. Ann. 
§ 48.981 (2015–16). 
289 Del. Code Ann. tit. 16, § 903 (2003); Fla. Stat. § 39.201 (2016); Idaho Code § 16-1619 
(2009 & Supp. 2017); Ind. Code Ann. § 31-33-5-1 (LexisNexis 2013); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§ 620.030 (LexisNexis 2014); Md. Code Ann., Fam. Law § 5-705 (LexisNexis 2012); Neb. 
Rev. Stat. § 28-711 (2016); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 202.882 (LexisNexis 2012); N.J. Stat. 
Ann. § 9:6-8.10 (West 2013); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-301 (2015); Okla. Stat. tit. 10A, § 1-2-
101 (2011 & Supp. 2016); Or. Rev. Stat. § 419B.010(1) (2015); 40 R.I. Gen. Laws § 40-11-3 
(2006 & Supp. 2016); Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-403 (2014); Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 261.101 
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privilege in cases of child abuse or neglect,290 others allow the privilege 
despite reporting obligations.291 Yet, at the same time, while potentially 
self-serving, statements by religious institutions indicate more 
willingness to disclose such communications.292 Many major religions in 
the United States no longer shield otherwise confidential 
communications of abuse, and some mandate reporting.293 Yet, despite 
the changing landscape, efforts to exempt abuse disclosures from the 
privilege remain at a standstill. 
Thus, a series of exceptions would likely leave clergy responsible for 
deciding whether to testify. After over a hundred years of statutory 
privilege, legislatures are no closer to writing a statute that addresses the 
 
(West 2014 & Supp. 2016); Utah Code Ann. § 62A-4a-403 (LexisNexis 2011); Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 14-3-205 (2017). 
290 See Greenwald, 2 Testimonial Privileges § 6:14 (3d ed. 2015) (listing New Hampshire, 
North Carolina, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Texas, and West Virginia as states that abrogate 
the privilege altogether in cases of abuse). 
291 See, e.g., Va. Code Ann. §§ 8.01-400, 19.2-271.3 (2015); cf. Wash. Rev. Code 
§ 5.60.060(3) (2016) (where clergy are not mandatory reporters but their testimony is 
provided statutory immunity from liability). Cf. Abrams, supra note 31, at 1142 (detailing 
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Church has adopted a “zero-tolerance policy,” whereby the church agrees to “cooperate with 
law enforcement to report and investigate abuse.” Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day 
Saints, How the Church Approaches Abuse, Mormon Newsroom, http://www.mormon
newsroom.org/article/how-mormons-approach-abuse [https://perma.cc/89GC-MBM3] (last 
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current problems with the privilege. This historical failure suggests 
identifying boundaries through a series of exemptions is unlikely. Rather 
than continue to foist this burden on clergy, it is time for courts to 
undertake this weighing more fully. Only a qualified privilege would 
return this responsibility to courts while simultaneously upholding the 
policy considerations underlying the privilege. 
CONCLUSION 
Legislatures and courts blindly assume that only an absolute clergy 
privilege can resolve religious policy concerns. This Article confronts 
this assumption. It uncovers how the language of the fifty states’ clergy 
privilege statutes reflects none of clergy’s reticence to rely on the 
privilege. This disconnect between what seems privileged versus what 
actually is cries out for legislative reform. 
That reform starts with an exorcism of the faulty premise underlying 
an absolute privilege. Not all confidences need shielding to foster and 
encourage spiritual relations. Nor does autonomy necessitate unqualified 
confidentiality. Using clergy’s own construction of the privilege 
provides a roadmap towards reconciling law and application. This map 
gives legislators, scholars, and the judiciary a path towards long needed 
balance between liberal admissibility rules and policy concerns shielding 
communicant disclosures. Codifying a qualified privilege recognizes the 
need for privileged communications while developing a conservative 
construction that concurrently respects religion. 
The longevity of the clergy privilege is a testament to America’s 
steadfast commitment to religious freedom. The purpose of this Article 
is not to undermine that commitment. Rather, it is to push against the 
“empirical assumption” underlying the absolute nature of the privilege. 
Neither clergy nor courts are willing to blindly privilege a wide swath of 
spiritual communications. Thus, it is time to dispel the long-standing 
myth preserving absolutist clergy privilege statutes. By clergy’s conduct, 
the privilege has already shifted towards qualified protection. Now is the 
time to recognize that shift. 
